Pinto transmit a message from President Goulart's personal envoy, General Albino Silva, describing a meeting with Fidel Castro, mostly discussing US evacuation of Guantanamo and the UN inspections of bases on Cuban territory.

Pinto describes a meeting with Roa in which Roa repeats a message from Fidel Castro's proclamation that the evacuation of the American base Guantanamo should be directed at not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union, to show both that Cuba is not a toy of the great powers and should be heard in the coming negotiations.

The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.

Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

A telegram dispatched from the Soviet embassy in Havana early on the morning of Saturday, 27 October 1962. Fidel Castro was at the embassy and composing an important "personal" message for Nikita Khrushchev. The alarmed Cuban leader anticipated US invasion in the next "24-72 hours."

A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.

January 25-26, 1968. F. Castro speaks of relations with the US and Kennedy, friendship with the USSR, as well as placement of missiles, security issues as the US's imperialistic nature, while extolling the virtures of socialism, Cuba, and "The Revolution." Castro also stresses that Soviet withdrawal of weapons from Cuba is a blow to the international Communist movement.

During Mikoyan's visit to Cuba, the Cuban leadership explains its position following the Missile Crisis. Fidel Casto suggests that, while the Cuban leadership still believes that the Soviet Union is sincere in its desire to protect the Cuban Revolution, mistakes had been made during the crisis. The Soviet decision to withdraw the weapons should was based on the exchanges between the Soviet leadership and US President John F. Kennedy, not on the previous agreements between the USSR and Cuba. Castro suggests that the USSR could chose to go back on its security guarantees to Cuba in order to safeguard the peace, but that the Cubans will resist American agression nevertheless. The document only contains the Cuban responses to Mikoyan, without the Soviet leader's answers.

Minutes of the meeting between Anastas Mikoyan, Fidel Castro, and other members of the Secretariat of the ORI in the Old Presidential Palace. The purpose of this meeting is to resolve differences between the Cuban and Soviet governments in order to protect Marxist principles. Among other things, they discuss economic sanctions against Cuba, military intervention by other Latin American countries, the importance of the Cuban revolution to Marxism, and Cuba's relationship with the United States.