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March 23, 1963

From the Journal of A.I. Alekseyev, 'Record of a Conversation with Fidel Castro Ruz, Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba, 20 February 1963'

Alekseyev describes a conversation with Fidel Castro regarding a warm letter from Khrushchev, the departure of Soviet servicemen from Cuba, and prospects for Cuba's relations with the US.

November 6, 1962

Ciphered Telegram from Anastas Mikoyan to CC CPSU

Mikoyan reports to the CC CPSU regarding his conversations with the Cuban leadership. Fide Castrol had concerns about the possible withdraw of all Soviet weapons and all military specialists from Cuba and the possibility of UN inspections on Cuban territory.

September 2, 1962

Note from Cuban Ambassador to Bulgaria, Salvador Garcia Aguero, to Bulgarian Foreign Minister, 2 September 1962

Warning about the content of Castro’s declaration with regard to US threats against Cuba. Reference to the media and other authorities copies of the declaration.

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Representatives from Brazil and Yugoslavia discuss the Brazilian proposal to the United Nations (1) denuclearization of Latin America, 2) Cuba will not interfere politically with its neighbors, and 3) guaranteed sovereignty for Cuba), about various leader's opinions on the resolution and about the difficulty that might be involved in the implementation of these policies.

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”

November 16, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 4:30 p.m., Friday

Pinto analyzes Fidel Castro's decision to accept the “unilateral inspection,” when, beforehand, he always rejected inspection of this character.

November 7, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:30 p.m., Wednesday

Pinto describes the current situation in Cuba from the perspective of the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. He says, "The country continues entirely mobilized for the defense. The attitude of the Government seems to be more cautious. Habituated for years of the threat and with the blockade in front of Havana, the revolutionary government is plainly conscious that the danger has not passed and can reemerge at any moment."

October 29, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 11:30 p.m., Monday

Pinto transmit a message from President Goulart's personal envoy, General Albino Silva, describing a meeting with Fidel Castro, mostly discussing US evacuation of Guantanamo and the UN inspections of bases on Cuban territory.

October 28, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:45 p.m., Sunday

Pinto describes a meeting with Roa in which Roa repeats a message from Fidel Castro's proclamation that the evacuation of the American base Guantanamo should be directed at not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union, to show both that Cuba is not a toy of the great powers and should be heard in the coming negotiations.

November 13, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, Havana

The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.

Pagination