Blas Roca explains that the Cuban Missile Crisis "ought to be viewed as a defeat" for Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Fidel Castro discusses the conditions of the Cuban economy and militia and expresses his belief that Cuba-United States relations are heading in a positive direction.

Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”

The tight secrecy continues to surround the conversations with Anastas Mikoyan, however in a conversation with Pinto, he reveals information concerning: Fidel Castro, Cuban-Soviet relations during the crisis and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

Pinto meets with Anastas Mikoyan and Fidel Castro to discuss Brazilian-Soviet-Cuban relations.

Pinto describes a meeting with Roa in which Roa repeats a message from Fidel Castro's proclamation that the evacuation of the American base Guantanamo should be directed at not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union, to show both that Cuba is not a toy of the great powers and should be heard in the coming negotiations.

A letter from Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos regarding a conversation he had with Anastas Mikoyan. The two discussed mostly the USSR's position on Cuba, to which Mikoyan expressed the USSR's support of Cuba (that it would retaliate if Cuba were attacked), but that peaceful coexistence was still the Soviet's plan to follow for the development of humanity toward socialism and the defeat of imperialism.

A telegram dispatched from the Soviet embassy in Havana early on the morning of Saturday, 27 October 1962. Fidel Castro was at the embassy and composing an important "personal" message for Nikita Khrushchev. The alarmed Cuban leader anticipated US invasion in the next "24-72 hours."

A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.

Report on the American effort to spread false rumors about the arrival of Soviet military equipments and personnel in Cuba. To counter this subversive attempt, the Cuban security organs has established full control of foreign correspondence and captured maps and intelligence reports.