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July 24, 1963

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 24 July 1963

Boissevain reports on Fidel Castro. During a banquet held by the Egyptian ambassador, Castro speaks to Swiss Ambassador Masset of a decision to nationalize the former building of the U.S. embassy, currently in use by the Swiss embassy acting as U.S. representatives. Castro is noted as having "the air of one who is boasting to a trusted friend about how he has crossed an opponent." Boissevain thinks it best to keep on Castro's good side and requests an illustrated work of the Netherlands to be sent as a gesture of goodwill.

July 8, 1963

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 8 July 1963

Boissevain writes in continuation of the previous cable regarding Castro's desire for a mediator in an agreement with the United States. The Swiss or Czech ambassadors are offered as alternatives by Boissevain. Castro also notes that the Cuban debt to the Soviet Union is far to large, although he still wishes to continue revolution, creating this impasse between Cuba and the United States.

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Representatives from Brazil and Yugoslavia discuss the Brazilian proposal to the United Nations (1) denuclearization of Latin America, 2) Cuba will not interfere politically with its neighbors, and 3) guaranteed sovereignty for Cuba), about various leader's opinions on the resolution and about the difficulty that might be involved in the implementation of these policies.

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Vidaković speaks with Brazilian ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto on Brazil's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations and Fidel's argument for Cuban sovereignty and independence.

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Vidakovic describes one of his (daily) meetings with Raul Roa. They discuss Cuban independence, U Thant and relations with Brazil.

October 27, 1962

Telegram from the Swiss Embassy in Cuba to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

A short telegram from the Swiss Embassy in Cuba to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the impression that Castro wants to await the reaction to the invitation of U-Thant to Havana, before he takes a position on the prompting to receive Swiss officials.

November 17, 1962

Letter from Swiss Ambassador to Cuba (Stadelhofer) to the Secretary General of the Swiss Foreign Ministry (Micheli)

Stadelhofer describes a short meeting with Fidel Castro. However, since the conversation took place at an event directly next to the table reserved for members of the government and since President Osvaldo Dorticós and Minister of Industries, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, were listening in, he had to refrain from addressing issues of importance.

October 25, 1962

Message from Swiss Embassy in Havana (Stadelhofer) to Swiss Foreign Ministry

Stadelhofer speaks with Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa, who assures Stadelhofer that he is working on putting a meeting together with Fidel Castro and Swiss officials.

November 16, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:30 p.m., Friday

Pinto discusses the current situation in Cuba and feels certain that Cuba depends more and more on Soviet economic help, but that Fidel Castro feels sure of that there will only be an overthrow due to an American invasion or by a prolonged total blockade, that will have more grave international implications.

Pagination