Politburo to the Soviet ambassador and representatives giving them language to use when discussing the American Air Force crash of a B-52 carrying hydrogen bombs in Greenland.

A Politburo memo about a B-52 bomber carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed off the western coast of Greenland, while trying to land at the United States Ai1 Force base at Thule.

An outline of next steps the Politburo plans to take in response to the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash.

Decision to approve the draft TASS publication denying the reported talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Korean issue.

The Politburo discusses what to do after the failure of the Reykjavik summit over Reagan's insistence on preserving the right to continue the SDI or "Star Wars" project, as well as the subsequent expulsion of Soviet diplomats from the US. In the angry, bitter meeting Gorbachev decides on the removal of 250 Soviets working in service positions at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

The Politburo discusses whether to permit Bonner to visit the United States to receive medical treatment and visit relatives, a decision complicated by concern about the potential risk of an embarrassing uproar if her request was denied barely two months before Gorbachev’s planned summit meeting in Geneva with Reagan.

Politburo discussion, presided over by Andropov, on how to respond to the Western decision to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe.

Response to the US State Department's protest of the arrest of Aleksandr Ginzburg, a prominent Soviet dissident, for alleged currency violations.

Memo concerns a directive for the discussions with US Secretary of State James Baker between May 16 and 19, 1990 in Moscow. There are also attachments concerning the quantity of warheads , cooperation, and the armed forces of the US and USSR.

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.