Account of the reception of the Chinese Ambassador Peng Dehuai. He requested that all Korean undergrad and graduate students be admitted to the Soviet summer schools, as well as Korean specialists who receive production and technical training in industrial settings the USSR (a total of 738 people). Gromyko notes that there are differences between the requests of Dehuai and Kim Il Sung, and that Dehuai has been asked to speak to Kim Il Sung, and clear up the differences.

Their discussion involves the idea of a definite Soviet victory in Korea, the failure of US soldiers and President Truman, the internal politics of the US; internal politics of China, the progress of the decision about Germany among the Soviets as well as other Western powers.

Memorandums from the VKP(b) CC to Vyshinsky and Roshchin regarding the Soviet and PRC stances on discussions in the UN General Assembly and Security Council on the Chinese intervention in Korea.

Message from Stalin to Zhou Enlai agreeing with Chinese conditions for a ceasefire and advising that the Chinese limit negotiations on a ceasefire until Seoul is liberated.

Shtykov gives an insider’s report of a meeting with Kim Il Sung and Pak Heon-yeong, in which they discussed the current desperate state of the KPA, possible advancement of the US forces over the 38th parallel and the extent of the enemy’s knowledge of Soviet Union deliveries to North Korea. Kim asks for advice concerning the appeal for military aid that the Political Council of the Worker’s Party of Korea plans to send to Stalin. Shytkov comments on the nervousness and desperation of the Korean officials.

Telegram from Gromyko to Zhou Enlai advising the latter to turn down the invitation for China to participate in the UN Security Council. It also explains the circumstances under which the invitation was obtained.

Gromyko suggests to Stalin, via Razuvaev, to turn down Vyshinsky’s proposal for publishing a communiqué about the American position in the armistice talks.

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.