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Documents

November 19, 1951

Soviet Politburo Decision with Approved Message from Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev requiring more clear explanation about the earlier inquiry regarding Korean situation.

November 20, 1951

Gromyko to G.M. Malenkov, attaching draft telegram to Razuvaev

Telegram from from Gromkyo to Malenkov asking for a review of a draft telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK, Razuvaev. The draft chastises Razuvaev for permitting the North Koreans to make an appeal before the UN without first consulting the Soviet Union or China.

November 21, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 26044, Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.

September 30, 1950

Ciphered Telegram, Shtykov to Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Instantsia (Stalin)

Telegram from Shtykov to Gromyko and Stalin reporting the dire circumstances into which the North Koreans had fallen in the wake of the Incheon landings. Mentioned is a correspondence between the North Koreans and Mao which hinted at possible Chinese aid.

December 12, 1979

CC CPSU Politburo Resolution # 176/125, Concerning the Situation in "A" [Afghanistan]

The decree is on the situation in Afghanistan.

October 29, 1980

Session of the CPSU CC Politboro on 'Materials for a Friendly Working Visit to the USSR by Polish Leaders'

The CPSU CC Politboro discusses the anti-socialist movement in Poland, and how the Polish leadership should deal with the crisis. The Politboro begins to form an economic solution for Poland.

October 31, 1980

Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, 'On the Results of a Visit to the USSR by the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, Cde. S. Kania, and the Chairman of the PPR Council of Ministers, Cde. J. Pinkowski'

A visit from Polish leadership reveals the extent of the crisis. Brezhnev believes that the Polish leadership is capable of maintaining control and quelling the counter-revolution, but that Poland is in dire need of economic assistance from the USSR.

Pagination