Mao informs Stalin that the Chinese volunteers could cross into Korea by October 15.

Stalin tells Mao that the British have been pressuring the Soviets to help for the North Koreans to withdraw to the 38th peril, and the Soviets are offended by this, and to want to insist on Soviet and PRC participation in the Security Council to resolve the issue. He also informs Mao of his willingness to send more planes, and more pilots to help train Chinese forces.

Stalin informs Mao that the Soviets are able to deliver 10 torpedo boats, 83 aircrafts - of which 32 are torpedo bombers TU-2, 35 are LA-11 fighter aircrafts -, 26 guns (37 mm), 8 guns (180mm), and ammunition. As for advisors, they're able to send an additional three.

Stalin informs Mao that his request was impossible to complete at the time, but that the Soviet government is able to send 600,000 units of ammunition and 332 guns. The ammunition will be supplied monthly from January-April, 150,000 each month. The guns will also be supplied monthly from January-February, 166 guns each month.

Telegram stating that it would be impossible to fulfill Mao's request on supplying arms and resources for a certain number of divisions, and that fulfilling even a fifth of his request (which they did) was difficult.

Stalin agrees with Mao's position on repatriation and says Kim Il Sung agrees as well.

Telegram from Stalin to Mao discussing the five advisors being sent to Beijing, and the military equipment being sent by the end of 1951 for the remaining six divisions -- the delivery of which is being delayed six months.

Telegram from Stalin to Mao stating that because of the conditions of production and transportation, it is almost impossible to ensure additional supplies (in the amount of the proposed one-fifth of the value of all applications from the September 8 telegram), and at the same time supply six infantry divisions with arms and equipment by the end of the year. Stalin states that they can take Mao's additional order on the delivery of military equipment in 1951, equal to one-fifth of the total cost of China's application, only on the condition that the supply of weapons and equipment for the six divisions are postponed for six months.

Telegram from Mao to Stalin discussing the points of agreement and disagreement between the Korean-Chinese and Anglo-American representatives of armistice negotiations.

Response to Filippov's [Stalin's] telegram from the 16th of January passing on Zhou Enlai's response. Zhou Enlai stated that the air force will be at the joint command of the Chinese and Korean airforce.