Mao informs Stalin that the Chinese volunteers could cross into Korea by October 15.

Stalin tells Mao that the British have been pressuring the Soviets to help for the North Koreans to withdraw to the 38th peril, and the Soviets are offended by this, and to want to insist on Soviet and PRC participation in the Security Council to resolve the issue. He also informs Mao of his willingness to send more planes, and more pilots to help train Chinese forces.

Stalin informs Mao that the Soviets are able to deliver 10 torpedo boats, 83 aircrafts - of which 32 are torpedo bombers TU-2, 35 are LA-11 fighter aircrafts -, 26 guns (37 mm), 8 guns (180mm), and ammunition. As for advisors, they're able to send an additional three.

Stalin informs Mao that his request was impossible to complete at the time, but that the Soviet government is able to send 600,000 units of ammunition and 332 guns. The ammunition will be supplied monthly from January-April, 150,000 each month. The guns will also be supplied monthly from January-February, 166 guns each month.

Telegram stating that it would be impossible to fulfill Mao's request on supplying arms and resources for a certain number of divisions, and that fulfilling even a fifth of his request (which they did) was difficult.

Stalin agrees with Mao's position on repatriation and says Kim Il Sung agrees as well.

Telegram from Mao to Stalin discussing the points of agreement and disagreement between the Korean-Chinese and Anglo-American representatives of armistice negotiations.

Passes on the message that the proposed procedure and terms of training of Chinese pilots in jet aircraft are satisfactory.

In agreement with the Chinese comrades, Korean reserves are to be withdrawn to Manchuria, including nine infantry divisions, and officers school, a tank regiment-in-training, and an air division with an aviation regiment-in-training. Six combat divisions will be preparing in Korea.

Account of the reception of the Chinese Ambassador Peng Dehuai. He requested that all Korean undergrad and graduate students be admitted to the Soviet summer schools, as well as Korean specialists who receive production and technical training in industrial settings the USSR (a total of 738 people). Gromyko notes that there are differences between the requests of Dehuai and Kim Il Sung, and that Dehuai has been asked to speak to Kim Il Sung, and clear up the differences.