This May 1983 RAND Report examines the dynamics of political leadership and prospects for leadership stability in post-Tito Yugoslavia. It analyzes the evolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) since the late 1960s and the enhanced role of its constituent republican and provincial LCY organizations. It traces the devolution of power within the LCY that resulted in decentralized leadership authority and decision-making based on interregional consensus. It recommends shifting appraisals of the Yugoslav leadership from the federal to the republican/provincial level. (An abridged classified version of this Report was issued in November 1983, and two declassified releases of the abridged version are referenced as Related Documents.)

This November 1983 RAND Report examines the dynamics of political leadership and prospects for leadership stability in post-Tito Yugoslavia. It analyzes the evolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) since the late 1960s and the enhanced role of its constituent republican and provincial LCY organizations. It traces the devolution of power within the LCY that resulted in decentralized leadership authority and decision-making based on interregional consensus. It recommends shifting appraisals of the Yugoslav leadership from the federal to the republican/provincial level. (The full May 2013 version of the Report and a first declassified release of the abridged version are referenced as Related Documents.)

This November 1983 RAND Report examines the dynamics of political leadership and prospects for leadership stability in post-Tito Yugoslavia. It analyzes the evolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) since the late 1960s and the enhanced role of its constituent republican and provincial LCY organizations. It traces the devolution of power within the LCY that resulted in decentralized leadership authority and decision-making based on interregional consensus. It recommends shifting appraisals of the Yugoslav leadership from the federal to the republican/provincial level. (The full May 2013 version of the Report and a second declassified release of the abridged version are referenced as Related Documents.)

Pak Geum-cheol and Puzanov are indignant with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, while Nam Il desires for the Soviet Union to expand an exhibit about the peaceful use of atomic energy in Pyongyang.

Letter from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev to Yugoslav leader Josep B. Tito suggesting that the time is ripe for a rapprochement between the two states and parties. Blaming former NKVD chief Lavrenty Beria and former Yugoslav leadership member Milovan Djilas for doing the work of the imperialists by attempting to drive a wedge between the Soviet and Yugoslav people and parties, Khrushchev suggests that the ousting of both will increase rapprochement between the two countries and be the catalyst for a a summit between the two leaders.

Letter from the CC CPSU to the CC LCY regarding the positive response given the CC CPSU by the CC LCY concerning the 22 June 1954 Soviet letter to the Yugoslav leadership suggesting the possibility of Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. The Soviets also suggest that they support the Yugoslav position on the question of the city of Trieste, a disputed zone between the Yugoslavs and the Italians.

Yugoslav response to Soviet approaches about normalizing relations between the two countries and the two parties. While encouraged by the Soviet gestures, the Yugoslav leadership remains cautious and suggests that the rapprochement take a slow and steady course, taking into account the differences as well as the similarities between the two countries.

Message of the President of the Republic Josip Broz Tito to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Illyic Brezhnev and answer of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the President of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia