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Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

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June 23, 1963	Hungarian Embassy in Havana (Görög), Report on Reactions to Fidel Castro’s Trip to the Soviet Union Chargé d’Affaires ad interim Erzsébet Görög writes a preliminary assessment of Castro’s state visit to the Soviet Union in 1963. Görög reports on improvements in Cuba’s party organization and positive reactions from the Cuban public and media on Castro’s visit. Görög notes different reactions to the visit between the economic/technical and artistic intelligentsia, adding that “Khrushchev managed to win Fidel over to his side in the Soviet-Chinese dispute.” Other topics include emigration and external counter-revolutionary activities.
July 18, 1960	Letter, Khrushchev to the Central Committee of The Socialist Unity Party of Germany, regarding Soviet Specialists in China Khruschev reports Chinese dissatisfaction with Soviet specialists that had been placed in China to aid in socialist economic, cultural, and military development. He notes that despite the dissatisfaction, the CCP insists that they remain in China. However, due to recent complaints by the specialists about being propagandized by the Chinese against the CPSU, the Soviet government has decided to withdraw the specialists from China.
March 15, 1964	Conversations between the Delegation of the Romanian Workers Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Pitzunda, 15 March 1964 (excerpts) Khrushchev and Mikoyan discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis in this excerpt from a conversation with a Romanian delegation in Pitzunda, Georgia (now Abkhazia). They discuss the Sino-Soviet Split, and Khrushchev complains that "the Chinese qualified us as adventurers, while on other issues they call us cowards," and explains his reasoning for defending Cuba.
February 26, 1989	Memorandum of Conversation: President Bush's Meeting with Chairman Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China, February 26, 1989, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon Conversation between Deng Xiaoping and President George Bush on Sino-US relations. Deng expressed the hope that the bilateral relationship would develop in a "new pattern" based on mutual trust, mutual support, and minimizing as much as possible mutual problems. They also discussed the continued tensions between China and the Soviet Union,
December 2, 1964	Stasi Report on Meetings with the KGB, 30 November-1 December 1964 Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson's recent election in the United States, Khrushchev's ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev's son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.
November 16, 1962	Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 6:30 p.m., Friday Pinto discusses the current situation in Cuba and feels certain that Cuba depends more and more on Soviet economic help, but that Fidel Castro feels sure of that there will only be an overthrow due to an American invasion or by a prolonged total blockade, that will have more grave international implications.
November 6, 1962	Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 10:30 a.m., Tuesday Pinto calls to attention the rude and violent tone of the proclamations of support to Cuba on the part of China contrasting with the relative moderation of the USSR and of its satellites. Pinto believes Mao is "taking a shot" at Khrushchev.
October 31, 1962	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Views on Khrushchev's Compromise with the United States on Cuba' The Chinese Embassy shares their opinion on Khrushchev's reconciliation with Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis. They believe: Khrushchev’s activities "amounted to a bowl of cold water, poured right over the Cuban people"; because of Khrushchev, those who sit on the fence have now leaned rightward; American imperialists will, under the banner of the UN, create troubles for Cuba; and Khrushchev exhausted his words to exculpate Kennedy, which invariably stemmed from the concern to arrange a Cuba deal as a starting point, with the ultimate goal to push for reconciliations to be reached on other questions.
October 14, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 59 Protocol 59 further details the focus of the Soviet Union just before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev was so confident that his plan with Cuba would go unhindered that he spent his efforts on resolving the Sino-Indian border conflict, thinking the matter with missiles was done.
October 11, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 58 Protocol 58 provides insight into what was occupying the mind of Khrushchev at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The theme of the meeting was centered around the Sino-Indian conflict, questions surrounding the McMahon line, and the future of Tibet. With the focus on China and India, it is reasonable to assume that the crisis caught Khrushchev by surprise.