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Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich Soviet Union Clear All

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November 6, 1962	Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 10:30 a.m., Tuesday Pinto calls to attention the rude and violent tone of the proclamations of support to Cuba on the part of China contrasting with the relative moderation of the USSR and of its satellites. Pinto believes Mao is "taking a shot" at Khrushchev.
December 11, 1962	Documents Concerning Conversations in Moscow between Cuban Communist Official Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev The report of a conversation in Moscow between Cuban Communist Official Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev, discussing Soviet-Cuban relations and public announcements of support.
October 25, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 61 In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.
March 12, 1962	Alexei Adzhubei's Account of His Visit to Washington to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-in-law and the editor-in-chief of Izvestia, reports on his meetings with US journalists and officials in Washington, DC. Especially significant was his 30 January meeting with President John F. Kennedy in which Kennedy compared the communist revolution in Cuba with the 1956 Hungarian Revolution suppressed by the Soviet Union. Adzhubei also described Kennedy's comments on German reunification.
October 31, 1962	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Views on Khrushchev's Compromise with the United States on Cuba' The Chinese Embassy shares their opinion on Khrushchev's reconciliation with Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis. They believe: Khrushchev’s activities "amounted to a bowl of cold water, poured right over the Cuban people"; because of Khrushchev, those who sit on the fence have now leaned rightward; American imperialists will, under the banner of the UN, create troubles for Cuba; and Khrushchev exhausted his words to exculpate Kennedy, which invariably stemmed from the concern to arrange a Cuba deal as a starting point, with the ultimate goal to push for reconciliations to be reached on other questions.
October 1964	The Polyansky Report on Khrushchev’s Mistakes in Foreign Policy, October 1964 Excerpt from a report prepared by Politiburo member Dmitry Polyansky on Khrushchev's foreign policy mistakes, presented at 14 October 1964 CPSU Central Committee plenum. Polyansky included a scathing denunciation of Khrushchev’s “adventurism” in sending the missiles to Cuba, causing the “deepest of crises [that] brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war.” Ridiculing Khrushchev’s claims of having achieved a successful “penetration” of Latin America, Polyansky dismissed his contention that the crisis had in fact ended with a Soviet victory.
November 11, 1962	Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.
December 3, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71 Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”
November 16, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66 Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.
October 28, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63 According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.