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Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

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December 3, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71 Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”
November 16, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66 Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.
October 28, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63 According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.
October 27, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 62 Protocol 62 illustrates how it was Khrushchev who raised the stakes during the missile crisis and dictated a new letter to Kennedy indicating he would only remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange of the United States withdrawing its military bases from Turkey and Pakistan. The Pakistan demand would later be dropped, however and the US would only agree to remove its IRBMs from Turkey.
October 25, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 61 Protocol 61 indicates Khrushchev was already taking steps away from the crisis unfolding. Khrushchev decided that the ships carrying the IRBM missiles (the R-14s) on the high seas should turn around and come home.
October 23, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 60 Protocol 60 details the first meeting of the Communist Party during the crisis. As Khrushchev is awaiting the announcement by President Kennedy of the discovery of missiles in Cuba, he and some of his colleagues briefly considered using tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a US airborne assault. But, at the suggestion of Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky, the Kremlin postponed its consideration of a nuclear response pending details of Kennedy’s speech.The Kremlin wasted no time in taking steps to reduce the risks of confrontation. It ordered some ships that were still in the Mediterranean to turn around. The Aleksandrovsk, the ship carrying the nuclear warheads for the IRBMs (the R-14s), was ordered to keep sailing, however, because it was close enough to Cuban shores to dock before the blockade went into effect.
July 1, 1962	Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol No. 39 Protocol 39 gives some evidence that Khrushchev was thinking about more than just Cuba. Khrushchev discussed the importance of getting the US to stop flying over the ships heading to Cuba. After discussing the timetable for sending the missiles to Cuba, Khrushchev led his colleagues in a re-examination of the Soviet Union’s policy on West Berlin. Berlin had not been a topic of discussion for months.
June 20, 1961	Free Europe Committee Proposal to Exploit Berlin Crisis FEC Directors C. D. Jackson and Whitney Debevoise discuss with State Department officials their ideas on using RFE to pressure the Soviets during the Berlin Crisis
August 4, 1961	Excerpts from Khrushchev's Comments at Conference of First Secretaries of CC of Communist and Workers Parties of Socialist Countries Selected excerpts from Khrushchev's concluding speech at a conference of Warsaw Pact leader, focused on the building crisis over the status of Berlin.
April 4, 1958	Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Zhou Enlai on the Prohibition of Nuclear Testing Khrushchev writes to Zhou outlining the Soviet Union's argument for the need to halt the testing of atomic weapons, and urges the Chinese to support and agree to the ban.