Blas Roca explains that the Cuban Missile Crisis "ought to be viewed as a defeat" for Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev explains his agreement with Kennedy to Ambassador Mikoyan, in which the Soviet Union promised to remove weapons from Cuba on the condition that the US will lift the quarantine and prevent further invasion or attacks on Cuba.

The Presidium decides to adopt Protocol 32.

Shorthand record of the meeting of the Political Bureau of C.C. of R.W.P. (26 June 1963), after the visit of Nikita Khrushchev in Romania (24-25 June 1963).

Ceauşescu was sent in the USSR by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej to establish a meeting between Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nikita Khrushchev. During the meeting, Nikita Khrushchev said to Nicolae Ceauşescu: “By sending missiles to Cuba, we ourselves put our head in a bind. I know comrade Gheorghiu-Dej was upset that I had not informed about sending missiles to Cuba. And he has been rightly upset."

Manescu reports on the discussions of the government delegation of the PRR with the CPSU and Soviet State leaders on 23 October 1962. They discuss mostly relations with Southeast Asian countries.

In this conversation between Khrushchev and Novotny, Khrushchev used exceptionally candid language to defend his handling of the superpower confrontation, what he described as “six days which shook the world.” While well aware that many fellow communists (including the Chinese and Cubans) regarded his agreement under pressure from US President John F. Kennedy to remove the missiles as a surrender to the imperialists, Khrushchev stoutly defended his action as not only a necessary measure to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war, but actually a victory. Khrushchev bluntly criticized Fidel Castro for failing to comprehend the true nature of war in the thermonuclear age and, that at the height of the crisis, he had suggested in a letter to Khrushchev that the Soviets should be the first to use nuclear weapons, striking the United States should it attack Cuba, even though this would lead promptly to a global war.

In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.

The Chinese Embassy shares their opinion on Khrushchev's reconciliation with Kennedy after the Cuban Missile Crisis. They believe: Khrushchev’s activities "amounted to a bowl of cold water, poured right over the Cuban people"; because of Khrushchev, those who sit on the fence have now leaned rightward; American imperialists will, under the banner of the UN, create troubles for Cuba; and Khrushchev exhausted his words to exculpate Kennedy, which invariably stemmed from the concern to arrange a Cuba deal as a starting point, with the ultimate goal to push for reconciliations to be reached on other questions.

Excerpt from a report prepared by Politiburo member Dmitry Polyansky on Khrushchev's foreign policy mistakes, presented at 14 October 1964 CPSU Central Committee plenum. Polyansky included a scathing denunciation of Khrushchev’s “adventurism” in sending the missiles to Cuba, causing the “deepest of crises [that] brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war.” Ridiculing Khrushchev’s claims of having achieved a successful “penetration” of Latin America, Polyansky dismissed his contention that the crisis had in fact ended with a Soviet victory.