Outlines President Nixon's decisions regarding France's request for military aid with their nuclear program. The restrictions on exporting advanced computers will be loosened, allowing France to import more powerful models. Limited technical assistance for their ballistic missile program will be offered, but only in areas that won't jeopardize US security or "provide France with a distinct new capability."

Kissinger sends a follow up memorandum to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding NSDM 103 and 104, on military assistance to the French nuclear program. Kissinger reiterates the classified nature of these decisions to offer aid and instructs them to inform the French "as soon as possible." They must also prepare guidelines for use in the event that the assistance becomes public.

Summary of Kissinger and French Minister of Defense Debré's meeting on July 7, 1972. They first discussed US-French nuclear cooperation and the recent US technical assistance to the French ballistic missile program. Debré requested information about Soviet missile defenses. The remainder of the conversation was about Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) and related nuclear security issues.

Transcript of a conversation between French Minister of Armed Forces Galley and U.S. officials, including Kissinger and Schlesinger. Galley says that the French are making progress and have benefited from their talks with Foster. Kissinger notes that the U.S. has a “cooperative spirit” with regards to French foreign policy. Galley notes the advances that have been made by the French and asks for aid with modernization of their forces to bring the French to the same level as the U.S., specifically in regards to missile hardening, underground testing, and submarines, among others. Kissinger notes that now that the French have missile technology, it is in the best interest of the U.S. that it be effective and not become irrelevant, but there is strong opposition not only from abroad but at home, as well. Kissinger wants to know how long the French can keep their advances a secret, and Galley notes that many things have already been kept secret and can continue to be kept as such. They end the discussion with talks about meeting again sometime in August.

Transcript of conversation between Kissinger and Schlesinger. Kissinger wants to make Galley "drool" by keeping him interested without actually giving anything up. Kissinger worries about what the British want in terms of Polaris and notes that putting the French on the same footing as the U.S. would scare the British enough to get their point across.

Kissinger wants to help the French without giving them too much. Foster thinks that the French have the worst missile program in the world, while the Chinese have the best. He thinks the best thing we can do is to look at their designs and offer suggestions, especially in regards to forming their objectives and planning how to meet them. Foster notes that any help we give to the French is perceived as a full commitment, so Kissinger warns that we must remain “cold-blooded.”

Scowcroft briefs Kissinger for his meeting with Galley. This lengthy document includes information on what the French are specifically asking for, the outline for the meeting (as proposed by Kissinger, himself), Foster’s notes for the meeting expanded, and a reminder to discuss underground testing.

Discussion between Galley and Blancard with Kissinger, Foster and Sonnenfeldt held in secret. Kissigner wishes to give the strategic assessment of France followed by Foster’s specific observances. Kissinger notes that the Soviets are expanding rapidly, and there is a need for a warning system. They discuss the importance of building up a deterrent, and the U.S. thinks it is feasible to assist the French in this regard. The French are asking for clarifications and information on MIRV and MRV. Kissinger discusses how these exchanges are not going through the normal channels, stressing the need for secrecy, though Congressional approval may be needed for some points, and they conclude by setting up a time for Foster to come to France.

Kissinger and Schlesinger discuss possible concessions to France in light of potential changes in their government. Other topics of discussion include foreign relations with the Middle East, MIRV, and security in Europe.

Kissinger briefs the president before his visit with Pompidou stating why the French may want a military alliance, as well as the problems associated with such an alliance due to the French attitude regarding NATO and nuclear forces. He then states the reasons why the U.S. should encourage French entry into the NPG and issues concerning joint targeting with the French. He further discusses issues of French/U.S. and French/British alliances that would be of possible interest of discussion when Pompidou visits the U.S. soon.