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September 27, 1950

Telegram from Feng Xi (Stalin) to Matveyev (Razuvayev V.N.) and T.F. Shtykov

Stalin blames the recent success of the UN forces in Seoul on the inefficiency of the KPA’s Frontline Command and Soviet military advisors, as well erroneous use of tank tactics and overall combat strategy. Stalin provides a detailed list instructing military advisors, and especially Vasilyev, how to delpoy and manage Korean troops around Seoul.

September 27, 1950

Telegram from Matveyev (Razuvayev V.N.) to Stalin

Matveyev describes the state of the Korean People’s Army, particularly the severe status of troops in Seoul and Busan after having encountered American air and ground forces. Matveyev also reports on a meeting between several Soviet and Korean foreign ministers in which Kim Il Sung assumed the tasks of both Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister and ordered the deployment of troops northward. Matveyev also outlines the steps he plans to take as a Soviet envoy in aiding the desperate Korean army.

September 30, 1950

Draft Telegram from Chanfu (Bulganin) to Matveyev (Razuvayev)

A response to Matveyev’s previous telegram approving the consolidation of power (as Supreme Commander in Chief and Defense Minister) to Kim Il Sung, the formation of six divisions, transport of ammunitions and fuel. Bulganin also unofficially advocates Kim’s plans to request aid from China.

October 2, 1950

Telegram from Chanfu (Bulganin) to Matveyev (Razuvayev)

Bulganin stresses to Razuvayev the importance of the withdrawal of the Korean troops “by all means” toward the north, in order to rescue the Soviet cadres.

April 18, 1953

Explanatory Note from Lt. Gen. V.N. Razuvaev to L.P. Beria

Razuvaev explains the steps taken to make it appear that Americans are using biological weapons in the Korean War. China initially sent reports of such weaponry, and soon after Korea, led by Soviet advisors, joined in the falsification of biological attacks by creating false plague regions with the help of the Korean Ministry of Health. After visits from two international delegations, Korea eventually abandoned its plan to falsely accuse America, while China continued to advance the story.

March 5, 1952

Memorandum from Gromyko to Stalin

Message from Gromyko (MID) to Stalin advising against the proposal of Amb. Razuvaev to publish an interview of Kim Il Sung on the grounds that it is inflammatory and rash.

November 19, 1951

Soviet Politburo Decision with Approved Message from Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev requiring more clear explanation about the earlier inquiry regarding Korean situation.

November 21, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 26044, Gromyko to Razuvaev

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.

July 16, 1952

Ciphered Telegram No. 502597, Razuvaev to Cdes. Vasilevsky and Vyshinsky, transmitting message from Kim Il Sung to I.V. Stalin

Telegram from Kim Il Sung to Stalin stating the current situation of the armistice talks and the pressure which is being exerted upon North Korea by uninhibited American air power. He makes a request for additional anti-aircraft support from the Soviet Union and China, which he believes will lead to a more advantageous bargaining position at the negotiating table.

Pagination