Stalin clarifies that his previous telegram of 30 January was not an order, but a proposal to discuss options with Korea.

Stalin sends a message for Kim Il Sung saying that he cannot give Kim Il Sung rifle-mortar arms, but can give him other types of ammunition.

Stalin blames the recent success of the UN forces in Seoul on the inefficiency of the KPA’s Frontline Command and Soviet military advisors, as well erroneous use of tank tactics and overall combat strategy. Stalin provides a detailed list instructing military advisors, and especially Vasilyev, how to delpoy and manage Korean troops around Seoul.

Matveyev describes the state of the Korean People’s Army, particularly the severe status of troops in Seoul and Busan after having encountered American air and ground forces. Matveyev also reports on a meeting between several Soviet and Korean foreign ministers in which Kim Il Sung assumed the tasks of both Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister and ordered the deployment of troops northward. Matveyev also outlines the steps he plans to take as a Soviet envoy in aiding the desperate Korean army.

A response to Matveyev’s previous telegram approving the consolidation of power (as Supreme Commander in Chief and Defense Minister) to Kim Il Sung, the formation of six divisions, transport of ammunitions and fuel. Bulganin also unofficially advocates Kim’s plans to request aid from China.

Bulganin stresses to Razuvayev the importance of the withdrawal of the Korean troops “by all means” toward the north, in order to rescue the Soviet cadres.

Message from Gromyko (MID) to Stalin advising against the proposal of Amb. Razuvaev to publish an interview of Kim Il Sung on the grounds that it is inflammatory and rash.

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev requiring more clear explanation about the earlier inquiry regarding Korean situation.

Telegram from from Gromkyo to Malenkov asking for a review of a draft telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK, Razuvaev. The draft chastises Razuvaev for permitting the North Koreans to make an appeal before the UN without first consulting the Soviet Union or China.

Telegram from Gromyko to Razuvaev instructing him to explain to the Chinese and Koreans the reasoning behind Vyshinsky's demand that the demarcation line be established at the 38th parallel rather than at the present front line.