The Department of State was unable to locate the Argentine uranium sold to Israel and was disturbed by the fact that the amount exceeded Israel's needs for peaceful use.

Owing to discrepancies in available data, the Department of State requested information on the amount of uranium shipped to Israel, any new agreements between Argentina and Israel, any safeguards put into place, and the current status of Argentina's uranium processing plants.

In a conversation with one or two State Department officials, a British Embassy officer notes that reports available to both governments estimate Israel's purchases of uranium to add up to 190 tons and proposed a joint US-British approach to Argentina on safeguards.

In response to a request for further instructions, the Dept. of State informed the Embassy that Washington was looking to establish a common policy on the mandatory application of IAEA safeguards. Until they were closer to agreement, the Embassy should request that the Argentine government apply safeguards to future deals.

In this cable, the US Department of State requested the Embassy to remind the Argentine government that it was still awaiting a response on the uranium sale to Israel, and asked the Embassy to review the "full extent" of Argentine exports of uranium.

This cable from the US Department of State expresses concern that the Foreign Office was slow to respond to questions about the Argentine-Israeli deal, particularly with regards to safeguards, and says that the Dept. of State, ACDA, and the AEC were considering more "representations" to Argentina and possibly to Israel.

Responding to the report from the US Embassy in Argentina, the State Department asked it to obtain as much information as possible on the end-use of uranium sold to Israel, and in particular on the issue of safeguards.

This joint State Department and CIA message reported an unconfirmed intelligence of an Argentine-Israeli agreement on 3 November 1963, and requested information on the specifics of the deal by 1 September 1964.

Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.

Provides an overview of preparations for the nuclear test as well as a discussion on the pressures weighing on Indian Prime Minister Rao to launch the test. Prepared by one of INR’s South Asia experts, Steven Ghitelman, it provides an overview of the test site preparations that began in November and decided described Prime Minister Rao as facing pressures to test from the BJP and from the nuclear establishment. The pressures were not insurmountable because other considerations were important, such as avoiding international sanctions, continuing steps toward economic liberalization, and pressures to support the CTBT. Ghitelman concluded that it would be “vintage Rao” for him to allow the scientists to prepare for a test “while not authorizing them to conduct one.” That is what happened.