The CCP Central Committee gives instructions to the Chinese representatives to the UN on how to reply to confrontation over the Korean issue. The Chinese representatives are to express willingness to end military action as well as desire to know the UN and the U.S.'s positions on the conditions for an armistice.

Zhou Enlai gives instructions on how the Chinese side should respond when confronted with questions of whether China should back down in regards to the North Korean issue and the Taiwan issue. In particular, he emphasizes that the Chinese side should focus on blaming American imperialism for the invasions of North Korea and Taiwan and maintaining that China's involvement in these issues is essential.

Zhou Enlai, Molotov, and Eden discuss the Korea issue, the Indochina issue, Sino-British relations, British-American relations, and the issue of five powers.

Soviet Premier Georgy M. Malenkov and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai discuss the incidents between China and Taiwan, the US’s support of Taiwan, and the US bloc in the South Pacific. They contemplate various means through which China could prevent further provocations by Taiwan and how to break apart the American bloc. Zhou Enlai also offers suggestions concerning the elections in Korea that would help accomplish Soviet goals for the area.

Zhou reports on the eleventh restricted session on Indochina. During the session, Zhou opposes using the UN as a supervisory body, and asserts that the joint commission should take major responsibility in implementing the armistice, and that the NNSC's function is to supervise the joint commission's work and the Indochina borders.

Zhou reports on the plenary session on the Korea issue. Mainly, Zhou writes of how the US is impeding negotiations because of their adamant stance in favor of UN supervisory body for Korean unification.

Zhou Enlai and U Nu first talked about the decision made on the Geneva Conference regarding the armistice in the Korean Peninsula and the role of the US in it. Then they talked about the elements that complicated the Sino-Burmese relations and the need for building mutual trust and signing a non-political agreement. They also discussed the principles they would have in a joint statement before the signing of this potential agreement.

Zhou discusses the need to make agreements at the Geneva conference in order to open a path for discussion and negotiation with the west. Zhou notes that because the US, France and Britain are not united in their opinions, the CCP must hold fast to their positions on the peaceful unification of Korea, and of peace in Indochina. Finally, Zhou suggests that the CCP prepare to discuss issues of trade, relaxing international tensions, and breaking the US embargo, although these issues are not on the agenda.