1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
-
Southern Africa
1931- 2022
East Asia
Middle East
1931- 2007
1944- 1991
1943-
1928- 2014
July 11, 1991
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 11 July 1991 describes the latest developments in Yugoslavia, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Cambodia and Lebanon.
November 25, 1989
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 25 Nov 1989 describes the latest developments in Czechoslovakia, Lebanon, East Germany, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, South Africa, El Salvador, Uruguay, India, and NATO-Warsaw Pact.
August 24, 1991
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 24 August 1991 describes the latest developments in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Lebanon, France, El Salvador, South Africa, China and Iran.
July 25, 1991
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 25 July 1991 describes the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, Israel, Lebanon, ASEAN, South Africa, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and Middle East.
September 7, 1989
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 7 September1989 describes the latest developments in the United States, Colombia, South Africa, Lebanon, Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Belize, Bolivia, Argentina, and Iran.
August 12, 1989
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 12 August 1989 describes the latest developments in Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Somalia, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, South Africa, Ecuador, Namibia, and Cuba.
July 1991
With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.
August 1977
With South Africa’s status as a pariah state, its nuclear program was a thorny problem for a series of U.S. presidents. In August 1977, the Carter administration, working with the Soviet Union, lodged protests against South Africa’s apparent preparations for a nuclear test, forcing a shut-down of the Kalahari test site if not the entire nuclear program itself. Indeed the CIA’s analysis of South Africa’s innovative “aerodynamic” uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba brought it to the conclusion that South Africa would be able to produce enough weapons-grade uranium “to make several nuclear devices per year.”
July 1982
With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing. Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas.
January 20, 1983
With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began was beginning to worry US government officials. These concerns did not go away during the Reagan administration. While nuclear proliferation was not a top priority, the administration was apprehensive about the implications of the spread of nuclear capabilities and that China may have been aiding and abetting some potential proliferators by selling unsafeguarded nuclear materials.
