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Documents

February 21, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.076

The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang reports on the February 15 naval clash between North and South Korea, and how the sides had responded to the incident

November 15, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061.465, Urgent

The document describes several gatherings of Korean People's Army corps in Pyongyang where military leaders presented a report underlying the necessity of increasing the level of technical and combat preparedness of the army. The author observes how the rhetoric of driving out "American imperialists" and unifying the peninsula had reappeared in North Korea.

October 30, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061487, Urgent

Soviet officials note their dissatisfaction towards the state of relations between the USSR and the DPRK. According to the Soviets, the exchange of delegations between the two countries is at an all time low, but they expect their relationship to improve in the next year. A similar "tenuous" relationship is observed between the PRC and the DPRK.

October 27, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061482, Urgent

Popa notes Kim Yeong-nam's concern regarding interference of the USSR and USA in the Yom Kippur/October War as a source of a wider conflict, contrary to the optimism expressed by the North Korean leadership.

August 29, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.360, Urgent, SECRET

The document mentions a forthcoming North Korean condemnation of Kim Dae-jung's abduction in Tokyo by KCIA agents. The author states that the declaration will ask Lee Hu-rak to be removed from co-presidency of the North-South Coordination Committee. Pyongyang seeks Romanian support in publicizing the North Korean position.

June 7, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 061.224

Popa notes the rift between the two Koreas since the North-South joint declaration in 1972 as Seoul considers North Korea's attempts to join organizations where South Korea is already a member as a means to undermine its authority.

April 23, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.150, Urgent, SECRET

The Romanians expect tensions to rise in inter-Korean relations after North Korea is accused of sending a group of spies to South Korea. Pyongyang is unable to convincingly deny its direct role in sending the spies and is called duplicitous by Seoul. The report suggests that recent events have acted as fodder for the argument on why US troops should stay on the Korean Peninsula

April 12, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061.121, Urgent

A Romanian diplomat reports on the second session of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly. The meeting focused on increasing the state budget to accomplish the 6-year plan with particular focus on heavy industry, machinery, raw material extraction, and energy production. The meeting also noted the need to increase the standard of living for the North Korean people. Nonetheless, no mention was made on collaborating with the outside world for economic and technological cooperation.

April 11, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.119, Urgent, SECRET

Conversation between Romanian and Soviet representatives reveals that North Koreans are slowly withdrawing from direct contacts with South Korea. Instead, Pyongyang is seeking external support for its position. Meanwhile, North Korea is now looking at China with increased suspicion after Zhou Enlai noted that Beijing was not interested in the withdrawal of US troops from Asia. On another note, North Korea asks the Soviets to forbid South Koreans to enter the Soviet Union for the University Olympics held there.

April 4, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.113, Urgent, SECRET

KWP Centeral Committee member Kim Yeongnam explains to the Romanian representative that the DPRK proposed changes in the North-South Coordination Committee meeting to ease tensions and transform the armistice into a peace treaty. Kim blames the South Korean hawks and separatists who abide by the interests of the US and Japan for the lack of progress. Despite the impasse, the North Koreans look to the internal dissent against Park Chung Hee in South Korea as a sign of support for Pyongyang.

Pagination