1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
1917- 2002
North America
East Asia
1919- 2010
1906- 1982
1924-
South America
South Asia
1909- 1989
1917- 1979
March 15, 1977
March 21, 1977
Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, records his discussions with US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance about SALT II negotiations.
March 10, 1980
Assistant Secretary Holbrooke informs the American Embassy in Seoul that Ambassador Kim Yong-sik and the ROK are extremely upset by Congressman Solarz's intent to go to Pyongyang. He emphasizes that Solarz is aware of US policy toward North Korea and would not carry a message from the US during his visit.
March 17, 1980
This note discusses Congressman Solarz's potential visit to North Korea.
July 31, 1977
The Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang reports to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the DPRK government does not intend to contact Cyrus Vance during his visit to Beijing.
June 12, 1979
Cyrus Vance authorizes William Gleysteen to report to the South Koreans on the proposed tripartite talks between the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea.
June 29, 1979
Cyrus Vance reveals that Jimmy Carter and Park Chung Hee hope to rely upon Indonesia to facilitate a tripartite dialogue between the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea.
August 5, 1977
Zbiginew Brzezinski offers instructions on how best to coordinate tripartite talks between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States, including how the U.S. should work with China, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations on this issue.
January 28, 1979
Cyrus Vance outlines the prospects for a new round of dialogue between North Korea and South Korea, as well as how the United States and China should encourage such a dialogue.
September 8, 1979
Anthony Lake, director of the Policy Planning Staff, writes to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance about available options to deter Pakistan’s further proliferation while still maintaining “good relations.” Lake suggests exploring the idea of pressuring groups and countries providing aid to Pakistan, and wonders whether the sale of F-16 fighter-jets could sway Pakistan’s military to scale back their nuclear effort.
