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November 20, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain)

The cable concerns the farewell dinner of Anastas Mikoyan, where Fidel Castro is notably absent, supposedly because he was seen drunk elsewhere. Mikoyan finally made Castro concede to UN Secretary General U Thant's last precondition to remove the IL-28 Soviet bombers from Cuba. Boissevain also reports on an air raid on a Cuban cargo ship, which was undamaged after receiving 11 bombs.

November 19, 1962

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 19 November 1962

Boissevain reports to Amsterdam the current domestic situation in Cuba, with attention being paid to Havana. In his words, Cuba is "on a war footing," and describes the various posters with propagandistic slogans urging the people to stand strong against a possible American invasion.

November 7, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 7 November 1962

The cable focuses on a report from the German embassy that in several places in Cuba, Soviet weapons are hidden under cement. There is still no progress on the dialogue between Fidel Castro and Anastas Mikoyan.

November 2, 1962

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 2 November 1962

The letter begins with Boissevain criticizing Castro's speech, claiming he could have written it before it was ever delivered. The speech concerned Castro's meeting with UN Secretary General U Thant, and the contents of the speech were such that the Cuban people were kept at boiling point. Boissevain claims this is a necessity to make the people accept the sacrifices demanded of them and forget the hardships they face. Castro's exclamations that "we are above all Marxist-Leninists" raised applause, but Soviet support has died down. Boissevain suspects Anastas Mikoyan will have a hard time reasoning with Castro after the disappointment in the eyes of Cuba.

November 2, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 2 November 1962

Boissevain writes a cable detailing a meeting between Fidel Castro and UN Secretary General U Thant. Cuba refused any inspection of missile silos, if the Americans did not uphold their pledge to not threaten Cuba with invasion. The Five Points were mentioned as preconditions for peace and Castro pledged Cuba was ready and willing to work towards peace. It appears Castro was aware of Soviet considerations for "global politics" as the reason behind the Soviet withdrawal of missiles.

November 1, 1962

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 1 November 1962

Boissevain reports on the aftermath of the crisis and its effects on Cuba, especially in Havana. Rather than the majority being in support of government actions while a minority supported the opposition, there is a public outcry from the masses about the Soviet handling of the crisis. Fidel Castro's response is a speech to the people explaining the Soviet reasons for their actions, while the Soviet Union voices its support for Castro's Five Points and sends Anastas Mikoyan to Havana as a "troubleshooter."

October 31, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 31 October 1962

Boissevain writes about a conversation between Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa and Brazilian Ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto. The conversation revolves around Castro's Five Points, and Roa claims they are not aimed at the United States but rather the Soviet Union whose concession to remove the missiles greatly disturbed Castro. The Brazilian Ambassador though the Cubans asked too much, while Roa said these points are negotiable.

October 29, 1962

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 29 October 1962

Boissevain speaks on the domestic situation in Cuba immediately after the end of the Missile Crisis. There are many counterrevolutionary groups who worry that current UN supervision of dismantling of the Soviet missile sites will preclude a U.S.-led invasion of Cuba, and perhaps might be the prelude to a normalizing of relations between Cuba and the United States. Raul Castro gives a speech saying the dismantling of the Soviet missile sites is a run-up to new Cuban demands, especially toward the evacuation of the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo. Raul goes on to address his brother Fidel, with assurances unity from the people, and obedience to any orders he issues. This raises the fear of what future demands Fidel may raise in the aftermath of this crisis.

October 29, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 29 October 1962

Boissevain writes after the conclusion of the crisis the Cuban response to the Tripartite Agreement. Fidel Castro proclaimed that no guarantee would be sufficient until all of the following had ceased: the naval and economic blockade, American aid to anti government forces and espionage, piracy from the United States and Puerto Rico, American military flights over Cuba, and dismantling the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay.

October 25, 1962

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 25 October 1962

Boissevain relates the Cuban response to the crisis. In a speech, Castro does not deny the placement of nuclear weapons, and claims this kind of denial has been heard more from Khrushchev. The impression is one of building missile silos which look like "ground-to-ground" launch sites from the air. The Cuban government is satisfied with the developments from the UN Security Council regarding the issue, as evidenced by the Havana airport being reopened for international flights.

Pagination