Two weeks after the accident, an unnamed KGB officer from the Ukrainian SSR reports on the situation in evacuation sites, the sentiment of local people, the situation in transportation hubs and at key industrial facilities in Kyiv, as well as about the measures taken to prevent foreign journalists from gathering information about the case.

This note explains the processes of localizing the effects of the accident, lead deposits in the area, and the evacuation of collective farms and the city of Chernobyl.

The document describes levels of radiation in the immediate area, populations which may have been affected, and steps which have been taken in the first few days following the incident.

This document relays data received from chemical protection troops on radioactivity levels in Pripyat.

This document summarizes the specialists' report on the lack of reliability of the reactors at Chernobyl, citing that the lack of protective layers and other structural flaws in the reactor that could lead to radioactive contamination and accidents.

The document refers to a conversation with a specialist in nuclear energy, who explains how gaps at the joints of pipes are causing problems in the blocks at both the Chernobyl and Kursk plants.

This document discusses weaknesses in the technical designs of nuclear power plants in the USSR and their potential consequences, concluding that the Leningrad, Kursk, and Chernobyl plants are extremely dangerous.

This document describes the deficiencies which were made in activities aimed at overlapping of Chernobyl disaster’s consequences. These deficiencies could lead to new victims because the security rules of handling with dangerous radioactive materials were broken.

Radiation levels in Pripyat and the surrounding area following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.

Physicists at the Academy of Sciences give advice for containing the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.