These notes (part of the Malin Collection) describe Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s decision to negotiate with Yugoslavia regarding the fate of Imre Nagy after his arrest and transfer to Romania. The notes state that negotiations are inadvisable and remain the responsibility of Hungary. A second section of the document refers to instructions to the KGB for discrediting Nagy.

KGB Chief Kryuchkov reports that research into Soviet repression in the 1930’s through 1950’s reveals that Imre Nagy willingly worked for the NKVD as an informant. Using the pseudonym “Volodya,” Nagy information is said to have led to sentences for Hungarian émigrés. Kryuchkov states that the documents should be shown to the Secretary General of the HSWP and possibly used in response to calls for Nagy’s rehabilitation.

Mikoyan-Suslov Report on the situation in Hungary, appointments to the Hungarian government, and discussions with the Hungarian leaders.

Mikoyan-Suslov Report on the deterioration of the political situation in Hungary. the report states that popular forces are taking over the radio station and the post office and that the Imre Nagy government does not want to use force against the uprising. Fearful of a strong reaction from the UN Security Council, Mikoyan and Suslov suggest that the Soviet leadership stop the inlux of Red Army units in Hungary for the time being.

Zhukov reports on the progress made by Soviet troops entering Hungary. He writes that troops have recaptured key institutions and buildings in Budapest and the provinces. Zhukov notes that the government of Imre Nagy has gone into hiding and that to prevent the escape of insurgents and leaders the Soviet army has occupied the airports and closed off roads along the border with Austria. The report describes remaining areas of resistance such as the Corwin Theater in Budapest.

Letter from Beria to Malenkov, 1 July 1953, taking blame for his inappropriate actions.

Khrushchev describes the events of the counterrevolution in Hungary and the crisis in Poland. He recounts the CPSU's consultations with other communist parties in the socialist camp to determine their attitude toward Soviet intervention, particularly in Hungary. Leaders from China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia agreed with the Soviet position, but Polish leaders opposed the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. Khrushchev reports that following these meetings, the CPSU CC Presidium decided to prepare for an attack on the counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary. He then reads aloud an open letter which declares the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government. He gives details about the suppression of the counterrevolution by Soviet armed forces and the positive reaction of the socialist countries. He states that the lessons of the counterrevolution are to improve relations with the fraternal parties and the socialist countries and to treat them with respect; to improve political work among students and the masses so that they are not mislead by counterrevolutionaries; and to strengthen the Soviet Army.

Kadar argues that the source of mistakes in the past resulted from the monopoly that a handful of Hungarians had on relations with the Soviet Union. Rakosi is singled out as a source for previous difficulties. Kadar believes that forming a new revolutionary government is the only way to undermine the violence of the counterrevolution and prevent Nagy from acting as cover for such activities. To garner support amongst workers, Kadar argues that the new government must not be a Soviet puppet.