The report describes the second meeting of the Nuclear Planning Working Group at the level of Ministers of Defense, during which a discussion about the planning, the use and the political control of tactical nuclear weapons has taken place. The document analyzes the SACEUR's position, the data related to the opposing armed forces existing in the European theater; the possible hypothesis of local conflicts and the problems related to the various scenarios. The London meeting was "open-ended", without leading to any concrete decision, and the topic appeared more complex than expected. The document observes that within the NATO there are diverging opinions on these matters.

The note describes the story of the project to establish a multilateral nuclear force within NATO, from the origins up to the current situation.

The note is about MacNamara's proposal to establish a Special Committee in order to broaden Allies' participation in the strategic planning of US nuclear deterrent and to reach a more efficient process of political consultation. The document outlines some points related to Italy's position.

Although the MLF topic isn't on the Atlantic Council's agenda, it will be nevertheless one of the topics discussed during the bilateral conversations. The document reports the current situation, Italy's position, the Italian diplomatic action and the viewpoint of other main Allies.
There are also 4 attachments (the European clause; an hypothetical MLF base in Italy; the timing of the project; a possible Italian financial commitment).

The project to which the document is related concerns only the strategic nuclear weapons, leaving instead the tactical ones under the specific territorial systems of control. The present document is about the components, political control and the NATO command.

The memo deals with the reorganization of political control and of the "command chain" with respect to NATO's nuclear deterrent (opinions of the UK and France, Italian and German criticism).
There are 3 attachments: 1) Multilateral Nuclear Force. Italian stance with regards to British proposals (2 pages); 2) British position on Multilateral Force - Message from Washington on 4th December (5 pages); 3) Reorganization of the Atlantic nuclear deterrent (12 pages).

In the use of nuclear weapons for a purpose other than response to an attack, NATO members must reach a majority agreement rather than a unanimous vote. Furthermore, this majority vote must include the United States.

This letter outlines the problems NATO faces as relations between member and non-member countries are complicated by conflicting interests. Not only is NATO struggling externally to play the field between free and communist countries in forming its alliances, but also internally to reconcile the different objectives of imperialist and non-imperialist countries and form a cohesive defense strategy.

Letter recounting a meeting between the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Foreign Secretary regarding NATO’s weapons development. Nuclear weapons should never be employed unless absolutely necessary and instead serve as an intimidation tactic to deter Soviet aggression. The necessity of increasing NATO’s arsenal of conventional weapons to match that of the Soviets was also stressed.

Letter expressing Germany’s opinion that the defense of Europe is impossible without using nuclear weapons as an intimidation tactic and horror at the United States’ suggestion that Europe can defend itself with conventional weapons alone. Defense of Germany should be NATO’s top priority because if Germany falls, the rest of Europe falls. The letter also references NATO’s difficulty in developing a cohesive strategy because each country is too concerned with protecting its own territories and assets.