Pinto describes the current situation in Cuba from the perspective of the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. He says, "The country continues entirely mobilized for the defense. The attitude of the Government seems to be more cautious. Habituated for years of the threat and with the blockade in front of Havana, the revolutionary government is plainly conscious that the danger has not passed and can reemerge at any moment."

The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

A report on Alekseev's 23 October 1962 conversation with Fidel Castro, together with two members of the Cuban leadership, the day after the public crisis began. Presented with official Soviet statements on the crisis, Castro reviews the situation and confidently vows defiance to the US "aggression," which he claimed was doomed to failure.

Alekseev discusses the response of Castro and Dorticos to certain documents.

Alekseev sends the results of a meeting with Cuban leadership, the Cubans were expressing discontent because of the fact that Soviet government had not consulted them on a number of issues.

Alekseev reports to the Foreign Ministry about Castro’s dissatisfaction about not being consulted regarding the question of dismantling. Alekseev shows him some letters that passed between Khrushchev and Kennedy.

Bakaev gives instructions to the captain of the “Amata,” regarding the UN representatives to be lodged on the ship.

Gromyko sends Mikoyan instructions on how to act toward Cuban and American officials, regarding the signing of the protocol after all weapons are removed from Cuba.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko cables the Soviet Embassy in Havana that the Soviet leadership had decided to allow UNSG U Thant and his representatives to visit Soviet launchers sites in Cuba and verify that the launchers are being dismantled.

Alekseev comments on the general attitude of the Cuban people in regards to the blockade and mobilization of the Cuban army