Skip to content

Results:

1 - 10 of 10

Documents

April 4, 1954

Draft Memorandum, 'A Comprehensive Solution for Restoring Peace in Indochina,' Prepared by the Vietnam Group of the Chinese Delegation Attending the Geneva Conference

The Vietnam group of the Chinese delegation offers a solution involving peaceful unification within Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, so that these nations can govern themselves as independent, sovereign states.

May 12, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Second Plenary Session (Excerpt)

Zhou Enlai reports mainly on the second session of the Indochina issue. Participants are divided on the issue of a ceasefire. The Republic of Vietnam's Pham Van Dong agrees that the releasing of sick and wounded POWs will include both French and Vietnamese troops.

May 15, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Requesting Instructions on the Korean Issue and Regarding the Situation at the Fourth Plenary Session on the Indochina Issue

Zhou Enlai reports to the CCP on his meeting with Anthony Eden, the fourth plenary session on Indochina, and his meeting with the Soviet and Korean representatives. During the fourth session, representatives from Russia and France spoke on their positions on the armistice in Indochina.

July 19, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twenty-third Restricted Session

Zhou reports on the 23rd restricted session on Indochina. The delegates of the conference hope to make an agreement on the 20th. Zhou notes that both the Chinese/Russian side and the other side have begun to make compromises, however Bao Dai's Vietnamese delegation refused to the division of Vietnam.

June 4, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Eleventh Restricted Session

Zhou reports on the eleventh restricted session on Indochina. During the session, Zhou opposes using the UN as a supervisory body, and asserts that the joint commission should take major responsibility in implementing the armistice, and that the NNSC's function is to supervise the joint commission's work and the Indochina borders.

June 5, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Twelfth Restricted Session

Zhou reports on the twelfth restricted session on Indochina. Participants consider Zhou's proposal that the NNSC should be responsible to the Geneva Conference participants. Molotov gives his counterarguments to Smith's and Bidault's statements.

June 28, 1954

Record of the First Meeting between Premier Zhou and Prime Minister U Nu

Zhou Enlai and U Nu first talked about the decision made on the Geneva Conference regarding the armistice in the Korean Peninsula and the role of the US in it. Then they talked about the elements that complicated the Sino-Burmese relations and the need for building mutual trust and signing a non-political agreement. They also discussed the principles they would have in a joint statement before the signing of this potential agreement.

March 2, 1954

'Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference,' Prepared by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (drafted by PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai) [Excerpt]

Zhou discusses the need to make agreements at the Geneva conference in order to open a path for discussion and negotiation with the west. Zhou notes that because the US, France and Britain are not united in their opinions, the CCP must hold fast to their positions on the peaceful unification of Korea, and of peace in Indochina. Finally, Zhou suggests that the CCP prepare to discuss issues of trade, relaxing international tensions, and breaking the US embargo, although these issues are not on the agenda.

January 10, 1955

Cable from Feng Xuan, 'Reaction of Britain, United States, France towards the Kuala Lumpur Five Countries inviting China to attend the Afro-Asian Conference'

The UK responded the decision of inviting China to attend the Asian-African Conference with anger, stating that countries in the Bogor Conference had wrong expectations toward China. The US feared that China would have great influence on the Asian-African Conference and thus weaken US influence in the region. The US and UK also worried that China’s participation would improve China-Japan relations. French press expressed this decision as the evidence of the failure of the US power in Southeast Asia.

February 3, 1949

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong

Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong converse about the mediation talks between the CCP and the Guomindang, Yugoslavia, coordination between the communist parties of the Asian countries, and the history of the CCP.