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Documents

1963

Report, 'Point 2. NATO situation'

Discussion of the relative roles of the United States, Great Britain, Germany and France in NATO and a proposal to revise the role of NATO as the threat of a Soviet attack increases.

April 27, 1961

Message by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for Political Affairs and Security (DGAP), 'NATO strategy. Conversation between our Ambassador in London and Lord Home'

Letter recounting a meeting between the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Foreign Secretary regarding NATO’s weapons development. Nuclear weapons should never be employed unless absolutely necessary and instead serve as an intimidation tactic to deter Soviet aggression. The necessity of increasing NATO’s arsenal of conventional weapons to match that of the Soviets was also stressed.

January 31, 1962

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

September 6, 1954

Australian Government Trade Commissioner, Hong Kong, to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 'Visit to China by the British Labour Party Delegation'

This is a report on a visit by Clement Attlee's Labor Party delegation to China in August 1954. The report covers wide ground, summarizing the delegates' experiences and views on events in China, and contains a short account of Attlee's conversation with Mao Zedong. Mao and Attlee disagreed about the Soviet Union's policy towards Eastern Europe, and Mao, after defending the Soviet record, in the end admitted that he simply did not know enough about the situation in Eastern Europe. There was also some discussion of Taiwan, though Attlee was given the impression that China would not attack Taiwan for at least 10 years. There is also an interesting quote: "The delegation... received or were confirmed in the impression that the Chinese Government was... living in a world of delusions. The state had been reached where the Central People's Government viewed the outside world not as it was but according to how they thought it should be."

February 11, 1945

Yalta Conference Agreement, Declaration of a Liberated Europe

The text of the agreements reached at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin.

March 26, 1954

Molotov's Proposal that the USSR Join NATO, March 1954

In this memorandum to the Soviet Presidium, Foreign Minister Molotov proposes that the Soviet Union publicly state its willingness to consider joining NATO. He explains that the proposal is intended to disrupt the formation of the European Defense Community and the rearmament of West Germany, and also limit the United State's influence in Europe.

September 29, 1953

Memorandum of Conversation between the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR and Gromyko

International relations between the USSR, China, USA, and England; a proposal to have discussions among the different nations in regards to the solution for post-WWII Germany; mention of an attempt to lessen tension.

October 1983

Memorandum comparing the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Anglo – French forces capable of reaching the Soviet Union.

A comparison between the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces and the Anglo – French system capable of reaching the Soviet Union. The memo uses data to demonstrate that the Soviet INF outnumbered by far NATO nuclear forces.

1982

Beyond the Cold War

Lecture by EP Thompson before the Worcester City Guildhall seeking to define the Cold War in a contemporary context. Thompson argues that the standard dichotomous definitions of the past have become improper and the Cold War is now best defined as a developed habit supported by the material interests of each side, most importantly military and political actors. He describes the Cold War as a method for leaders to easily access the ideological regulation and social discipline needed to ensure their positions. Therefore, Thompson argues, since these leaders have a direct interest in its continuance, people, and not states, must bring about any significant change in the Cold War.