Canadian officials warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero. This dispatch from Brussels reported “substantial unhappiness” amongst the Europeans that the United States and the Soviet Union would discuss disarmament “even if neither of them believed in it.” Nuclear deterrence had prevented war in Europe for the preceding four decades, and US-Soviet discussions of disarmament only made it even more difficult to convince public opinion of deterrence’s continued importance

An outline of the Dutch position on the modernization of Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) in Europe as of late 1979. It includes extensive discussion of Dutch domestic political challenges associated with supporting TNF modernization, the proposed connection between TNF modernization and the fate of SALT II as well as an enumeration of military/technical conditions under which TNF modernization would be viewed as more palatable by the Dutch government.

Willy Brandt speaks about East-West relations, specifically focusing on what he views as U.S. misconceptions about nuclear arms, and the concept of Common Security.

Memorandum of an extended one-on-one conversation between the Dutch and Italian Prime Ministers focusing in particular on a description of the reasons for Italy's strong support for TNF modernization as outlined by Cossiga.

Willy Brandt writes to Leonid Brezhnev about issues plaguing arms control negotiations between the US and the USSR. Particular attention is paid to the way the US Presidential election has hampered progress.

Leonid Brezhnev writes to Willy Brandt about ongoing US-Soviet arms negotiations.

A memo to Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi from his Diplomatic Counselor Antonio Badini. Badini warns against the latest Soviet proposals. He suggests that agreeing to them without making any concessions regarding the deployment of American missiles would be tantamount to the realization of a long term goal of the Soviet Union, i.e. the decoupling between the Western European and the American defense system. […] He writes that the Soviet proposals “can be taken as a possible basis for an agreement is surprising. We can
only hope that this fact does not imply that, from a political and psychological standpoint, the process of Finlandization of Europe is far more advanced than we believed thus far.”

This memo expresses the regrets of the Italian government for the failure of the INF negotiations. According to the memo, Italy “committed itself to the normalization of the East – West dialogue” and proposed resuming Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks.

An exhaustive memo on the deployment of the Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces from 1977 to 1983.

President Carter writes to Prime Minister Andreas van Agt about the proposal for Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) modernization and asks for Dutch support.