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Documents

March 8, 1961

Note Assessing Italian Strategic Vulnerability

Evaluation of vulnerability to Soviet aggression due to Italy’s geographic location (the middle of the Mediterranean Ocean) and political position (mostly communist). Reporting on the decision to increase nuclear weapons as well as bolster the air force in order to protect Italy and surrounding Mediterranean countries, which becomes essential considering the Soviet Union has made open threats directed at Europe and NATO.

May 30, 1961

Memorandum by Chief of Defense Staff Aldo Rossi to Minister of Defense Andreotti, 'NATO new strategic approach'

Rossi describes the recent trend of the US Administration to want to turn away from the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, towards the acquisition of a new strategic concept that includes an increase in the "nuclear threshold." In order for Italy to continue to lead the defense of central and southeastern Europe against the Soviet Union as well as address its internal social and political crises, the United States must provide Italy with financial assistance.

December 21, 1960

Report to Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Segni

Praise for Paul-Henri Spaak in helping NATO unify Western Europe and integrate the Allied states’ economic, political, and military objectives in their ongoing struggle against the Soviet Union.

January 1, 1985

Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'European participation to the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Political implications'

The report seeks to assess the possible strategic and political implications if Europe decides to join the SDI. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Soviet Union, but ramifications for East-West relations cannot be ignored.

January 1, 1985

Letter by Ambassador in Moscow Sergio Romano to Minister of Foreign Affairs Andreotti

Italian Ambassador to Moscow, Sergio Romano, writes to Foreign Minister Andreotti to dicuss the topic of the Soviet attitude towards the SDI, and the unsuccessful efforts by the Soviets to pursue a similar defense system. Even though SDI is no longer a hindrance to superpower dialogue, it would be a mistake to assume that the USSR has given up the battle against the overall missile defense system.

June 27, 1973

Telegram by Ambassador Pignatti to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'US-USSR Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war'

The document describes initial reactions to the signing of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War in Washington. The new agreement raises concerns over the bipolar focus of US-USSR relations, NATO's traditional strategy, and poses questions related to autonomous European defense.

October 15, 1985

Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Geneva negotiations - New Soviet proposals. An assessment'

A detailed evaluation of Soviet negotiation position vis-à-vis USA and Europe suggests that Moscow's willingness to agree on reductions and limitations does not meet Western needs. Gorbachev's doctrine seems to be in line with his predecessors, although increasing attention has been directed at Europe.

December 14, 1978

Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The autumn sessions of NATO Ministers of Defense meetings (Eurogroup: 4th December; DPC 5th-6th December 1978)'

The 1978 fall sessions of the Eurogroup and the Defense Planning Committee discussed the Alliance's reaction to new nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union and conventional build up of the Warsaw Pact. Even though the NATO states acknowledge that the Soviet Union will not be able to maintain its current efforts due to its economic problems, 1980s are seen as posing risks to the current peace.

February 27, 1986

Brussels to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Zero Option and the Europeans'

Canadian officials warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero. This dispatch from Brussels reported “substantial unhappiness” amongst the Europeans that the United States and the Soviet Union would discuss disarmament “even if neither of them believed in it.” Nuclear deterrence had prevented war in Europe for the preceding four decades, and US-Soviet discussions of disarmament only made it even more difficult to convince public opinion of deterrence’s continued importance

October 12, 1945

TASS Digest, 'The Mexican Press about Byrnes' Statement; etc.'

Excerpts from articles on James Byrnes, General Mark W. Clark, Clement Attlee, and US refusal to share technical information about the atomic bomb.

Pagination