Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

Summarizes the first comments from Min. Foreign Affairs on the agreement Soviet-American for the Prevention of Nuclear War. It is said that the philosophy of this agreement appears to have contradictions with regard to the classic strategy of NATO and diminish the credibility of the latter. Conceptions NATO military will have to be updated in light of recent agreements and ongoing trends around the Russian-American bipolarity. Just because you are at a "secondary" compared to the two supergrandi, Europeans should take the opportunity arising from this new trend to seriously address the issue of their defense. The prospect more desirable at this stage is an acceleration of proesso European unification, including the appearance of its "independent" defense.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in April 1989 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in August 1988 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in July 1988 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in June 1988 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in May 1988 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in February 1988 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in December 1987 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in November 1987 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.