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Documents

October 13, 1965

Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Special committee proposed by MacNamara'

The note is about MacNamara's proposal to establish a Special Committee in order to broaden Allies' participation in the strategic planning of US nuclear deterrent and to reach a more efficient process of political consultation. The document outlines some points related to Italy's position.

November 1964

Memorandum by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'NATO's nuclear weapons'

The memo deals with the reorganization of political control and of the "command chain" with respect to NATO's nuclear deterrent (opinions of the UK and France, Italian and German criticism).
There are 3 attachments: 1) Multilateral Nuclear Force. Italian stance with regards to British proposals (2 pages); 2) British position on Multilateral Force - Message from Washington on 4th December (5 pages); 3) Reorganization of the Atlantic nuclear deterrent (12 pages).

April 1, 1961

Memorandum by Admiral Corrado Tagliamonte to the Minister of Defense, 'American attitude toward NATO. President Kennedy's declarations'

Report submitted to the Italian Minister of Defense regarding President Kennedy’s opinion that NATO should not construct a special nuclear force since the US has already developed a nuclear deterrent. According to the Kennedy, the creation of an additional deterrent would be useless and a waste of resources.

February 27, 1986

Brussels to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Zero Option and the Europeans'

Canadian officials warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero. This dispatch from Brussels reported “substantial unhappiness” amongst the Europeans that the United States and the Soviet Union would discuss disarmament “even if neither of them believed in it.” Nuclear deterrence had prevented war in Europe for the preceding four decades, and US-Soviet discussions of disarmament only made it even more difficult to convince public opinion of deterrence’s continued importance

January 31, 1962

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

November 23, 1977

Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), Report of the IKV Meeting of 23 November 1977

In this meeting, The IKV responds to NATO discussions about a possible introduction of the 'N-bomb' [neutron bomb]. The neutron bomb would will probably be introduced; however the IKV needs to do all that it can to prevent its arrival.

April 1989

Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack'

This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in April 1989 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.

May 28, 1983

CC CPSU on Withdrawal from Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations (2)

The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

May 28, 1983

CC CPSU on Withdrawal from Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations (1)

The CC CPSU announces that it is breaking off negotiations with the US and NATO on Strategic Arms Reduction.

May 18, 1983

Information for Soviet Embassies on the Strategic Arms Reduction Negotiations

Report on the progress of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), complaining that the American proposals are not acceptable from the Soviet perspective.

Pagination