Report from NATO's Intelligence Conference (AHIWG) where member states reviewed and updated two key intelligence documents: "Strength and Capabilities of the Soviet bloc" (MC 161/73) and "Warsaw Pact Penetration and Military Presence in the Middle East, North Africa and adjacent areas" (MC 255/73).

The document describes the Declaration produced at the meeting of Heads of state and governments in Brussels. The declaration reaffirms solidarity between the Western allies and the essential nature of the transatlantic relations in managing security and disarmament.

The document discusses the internal debate caused by Schultz's address at the Atlantic Council of Ministers. NATO countries are divided into two camps regarding the strategy and pace of nuclear disarmament and reduction talks.

This analysis focuses on the state of European security cooperation, discussing both common defense and coordination of military production. It criticizes the lack of unity, complexity of the current configuration, and its negative impact on transatlantic relations.

Overview of the key security issues facing the Alliance in preparation for the December 1984 meeting in Brussels. The document discusses the state of Alliance, conventional and nuclear weapons, and the installment of INF in Europe, focusing on the potential for continuing East-West dialogue around disarmament.

This rather technical document compares the strategic capabilities (conventional and nuclear) of Warsaw Pact and NATO. The document notes that Warsaw Pact has considerably increased its capabilities catching up with the West, and raises the question about Soviet intentions, and whether continuing armament is in line with peaceful coexistence.

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

An outline of key points made in each of several meetings over a one week period. Includes the following: the Netherlands and Belgium will try to decide as late and as simultaneously as possible on TNF modernization; Italy will try to help the Dutch influence FRG and U.S. positions; U.K. is committed to helping Dutch cabinet remain intact; FRG does not oppose the Dutch move to delay their decision but also believes Netherlands should not try to block NATO decision-making.

Information obtained by the Dutch government regarding Belgian discussions on the modernization of NATO’s intermediate nuclear weapons. The Belgian cabinet agrees that TNF should be linked with arms negotiations, with a reevalutation of progress every 6 months used to direct modernization, in order to guarantee the lowest possible level of military balancing.

Defense Minister Scholten writes to other NATO Defense Ministers to clarify the position of the Netherlands on TNF modernization. He focuses on issues related to the size of the modernization program, which in its current state he fears is too large, and also the possibility of separating the issues of making a decision on modernization and then implementing it. The British Defense Secretary then writes to refute each of his concerns on the wider issue of TNF modernization. An addendum focuses more specifically on the issues relating to the Netherlands.