The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 7 September1989 describes the latest developments in the United States, Colombia, South Africa, Lebanon, Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Belize, Bolivia, Argentina, and Iran.

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

In this meeting, The IKV responds to NATO discussions about a possible introduction of the 'N-bomb' [neutron bomb]. The neutron bomb would will probably be introduced; however the IKV needs to do all that it can to prevent its arrival.

In this letter, Faber asks Boskma to write a pamphlet for the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) about nuclear weapons and to help think about IKV’s strategy against these weapons for an upcoming campaign. Even though direct action is the new and primary strategy for the campaign, writing publications is identified by IKV president Ter Veer as "one of the most important tasks of the peace movement."

Diplomat A.J. Meerburg writes to activist Mient Jan Faber about nuclear proliferation and disarmament issues, illustrating the amiable relations that developed between social activists and national security professionals and activists in the Netherlands.

Meeting minutes showing the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense's respective interests in the IKV and Pax Christi's "small-steps-theory," a theory on gradual disarmament through a series of small unilateral steps. Includes discussion concerning a proposal to form a study group of both interested civil servants and peace activists to formulate an alternative policy.

This document provides an extensive analysis and critique of the balance of nuclear deterrence. Analysis includes objections to the balance of nuclear deterrence theory. This marks the first time that the IKV ever articulated such objections.

Memorandum presented at 11 October 1963 meeting of the Dutch Council of Ministers. The memorandum is highly critical of the military merits of the proposed NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force, and argues that even if the MLF is created, the Netherlands should decline to participate.

An outline of the Dutch position on the modernization of Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) in Europe as of late 1979. It includes extensive discussion of Dutch domestic political challenges associated with supporting TNF modernization, the proposed connection between TNF modernization and the fate of SALT II as well as an enumeration of military/technical conditions under which TNF modernization would be viewed as more palatable by the Dutch government.

A summary of points made during U.S.-Dutch discussions related to TNF. The Dutch will not oppose NATO’s plans, but only postpone its own decision. However, the Dutch will continue to register their reservations regarding the scope of modernization. The U.S. disagrees with a Dutch proposal to link TNF modernization with SALT II ratification and states that the Dutch should refrain from critiquing TNF modernization since it is postponing its own decision on the issue.