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South Asia

Afghanistan

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Afghan resistance fighters return to a village destroyed by Soviet forces

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

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South Asia

Pakistan

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich

1931- 2022

Pakistani Nuclear History

Leonid Brezhnev, 1974.

Brezhnev, Leonid Il'ich

1906- 1982

The Taj Mahal Shrine in Agra, India.

South Asia

India

Official portrait for President Jimmy Carter, 1978.

Carter, Jimmy

1924-

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

-

President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

United States-Soviet Relations

George H.W. Bush and Lech Walesa

CIA Reports on the Collapse of Communism in Europe

Official portrait for President George H.W. Bush, 1989.

Bush, George H.W.

1924- 2018

Andrei Gromyko at the UN, 1981

Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich

1909- 1989

Soviet Union and the Olympics

Photograph of Gorbachev-Bush summit at Malta, 1989

End of the Cold War

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Documents

February 17, 1984	Hugh Montgomery, director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, to Ambassador Ronald Spiers, Enclosing 'India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation,' Report 778-AR A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.
1983	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan: Security Planning and the Nuclear Option,' Report 83-AR A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.
November 8, 1982	'Pakistan-US: Demarche on F-16 Equipment,' 11/8/82, with Memo from McMahon to Carlucci, 'Risk Assessment of the Sale of AN/ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan,'1 1/8/82, and Excerpt from Natl Intel Est on Pakistan With delivery of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers imminent, Pakistan threatens to refuse delivery unless the U.S. agrees to include the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. CIA analysts have concerns that including this sensitive radar technology in the delivery of the F-16s would enable China, a close military ally of Pakistan, to obtain and study the device.
June 17, 1982	Terry Jones, Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, Dept of State, to J. Devine et al., enclosing summaries of State Dept cable traffic during 1981-1982 relating to demarches on attempted purchase of sensitive nuclear-related products A summary of U.S. State Department cable traffic regarding Pakistan’s nuclear efforts in 1981-1982. While the Reagan administration was inclined to give Pakistan some leeway in light of their support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology from abroad was still something that the administration was against. Evidence that Pakistan had made efforts, some successful, to acquire specific technology that suggested a nuclear test was being prepared raised a red flag in the U.S. government
August 20, 1981	Acting Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence, National Foreign Assessment Center, to Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 'Warning Report-Nuclear Proliferation' In response to an IAEA report that Pakistan diverted plutonium from the Karachi nuclear power plant, a CIA analysis suggests that the Pakistanis “were not overly concerned” about these events. Of greater concern to regional security and stability was the discussions of the sale of F-16 fighter-bombers as part of a U.S. aid package to ensure Pakistan’s cooperation in the covert efforts against Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
January 31, 1980	Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Ambassador-at-Large Gerard C. Smith, enclosing excerpts from memoranda of conversations with Geng Biao and Deng Xiaoping. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had an immediate impact on U.S. policy toward Pakistan and U.S. aid to the anti-Soviet resistance through Islamabad. With these considerations, the U.S. chose to “set [the nuclear issue] aside for the time being.”
April 2004	KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82 Materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin to CWIHP, following the publication of the Working Paper No. 40, "The KGB in Afghanistan." As with all Mitrokhin’s notes, his compilation on Soviet “active measures” in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for CWIHP. Please read the Notes on Sources for information on the nature and limitations of these documents.
March 11, 1980	Letter to the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Chairman of the Socialist International, Willy Brandt A letter from Brezhnev to Willy Brandt before their meeting in Madrid. Discusses detente and the disarmament.
February 29, 1980	Report on the Meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of the Socialist Countries in Moscow, 26 February 1980 This document explains the views of the cooperating Socialist countries relating to Afghanistan. The USSR perceived the US attempt to line up NATO support against the Soviets as an aggressive action, designed to counter Soviet influence. The Soviets, by contrast, viewed their involvement in Afghanistan as increasing their sphere of influence around the Warsaw-pact countries, making such actions defense, rather than offensive. The USSR's leadership states that it should increase its ties to NATO countries to counteract the foreign policy of the US.
1980	Soviet briefing on the correspondence between Tito and Brezhnev This document reveals correspondence between Brezhnev and Tito. Tito expresses his worries about international politics relating to NATO's decision regarding long/medium range missiles, and advocates for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Brezhnev emphasizes the ideological and pragmatic importance of Soviet involvement in the Middle East, and discusses the role of NATO in Europe.