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July 1991

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 5-91C, 'Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control'

With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.

July 1, 1950

Conversation between Indian Ambassador Kavalam Madhava Panikkar and Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu

Zhang Hanfu and K.M. Panikkar discuss the role of the United Nations in ending the conflict in Korea.

December 8, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, 'Deputy Minister Ryu Handed Over Kim Il Sung's Reply Letter to Premier Zhou'

Kim Il Sung expressed his support for China in the Sino-Indian dispute.

October 24, 1962

Memorandum of Conversation between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu and Chargé d’Affaires Counselor from the Embassy of North Korea in China Jeong Pung-gye

Zhang informed Jeong Pung-gye of the details of the fighting along the Sino-Indian border as well as expressed support for Cuba regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis.

December 13, 1950

Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Wu Xiuquan and Qiao Guanhua

Zhou Enlai expresses that China is the most interested in the opinion of the U.S. and the UN regarding the conditions for an armistice on the Korean peninsula, and makes clear that the 38th parallel is no longer in existence.

April 9, 1981

Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

March 6, 1954

Cable from Zhang Wentian, 'Reporting the Preliminary Opinions of Our Side on the Geneva Conference to the Soviet Side'

Zhang Wentian discusses his visit with Molotov. During this meeting, Molotov says delegations from China, Korea, and Vietnam are welcome to Moscow before the Geneva conference to discuss its proceedings. Molotov also mentions several issues that still need to be discussed, such as relaxing tensions in Asia, Korean unification, ministers in attendance at the conference, and India's participation in the Indochina discussion.

September 19, 1952

Minutes of Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai

Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai focusing on the Korean War. They discussed the exchange of POWs (and the Mexican proposal), peace negotiations, Chinese cooperation with India and Burma, and the creation of regional organizations. They also mentioned Germany (reunification), the situation/reforms in Xinjiang, Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), and military aid.

July 5, 1950

Ciphered Telegram No. 3172, Stalin to Zhou Enlai via Roshchin

A telegram from Stalin to Zhou Enlai with regards to India's mediation in the PRC's entry into the UN, Chinese troop movements in preparation for a possible Southern/Allied counterattack, and Soviet planes flying over Manchuria.

July 13, 1950

Ciphered telegram, Filippov [Stalin] to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)

Telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou Enlai detailing his response to the English protest concerning "the Korean question." Also, a request for confirmation of Chinese troop movements to the Sino-Korea border, in case of a repulse of North Korean forces. Finally, a confirmation of the plans to train Chinese pilots on Soviet jets, to be followed by the transfer of the jets to Chinese possession.

Pagination