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Documents

1983

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan: Security Planning and the Nuclear Option,' Report 83-AR

A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.

June 25, 1981

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'India-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential Repercussions'

A U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research report offers an overview of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, and speculates how the development of a weapon in one country could strain relations with Washington and lead to a regional nuclear arms race. India is less likely to take preventive action against Pakistan because of the risk of “antagonizing China,” the report suggests.

April 9, 1981

Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

January 14, 1972

State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note, 'India to Go Nuclear?'

The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) evaluates the available intelligence on India’s nuclear intentions. There were varying reports that India would test a device that month, sometime in 1972, or that the government was undertaking a program to test a “peaceful nuclear explosive.” According to INR, India had the capability to produce some 20-30 weapons, and it could easily test a device in an underground site, such as an abandoned mine, that would be hard to discover. Because the U.S. government had given a “relatively modest priority to... relevant intelligence collection activities” a “concerted effort by India to conceal such preparations... may well succeed.” What would motivate India to test, the analysts opined, were domestic political pressures and concerns about China and Pakistan.

November 16, 1962

Information on the DPRK Position Regarding Measures by the Soviet Government for a Peaceful Resolution of the Cuba Conflict and Regarding the Chinese-Indian Border Conflict

The reporter notes that the Korean press, Kim Il Sung, and the Korean Labor Party didn't talk much about Soviet aid for Cuba, and that North Korea supports China in the Chinese-Indian boundary dispute.

July 6, 1976

Report, Embassy of Hungary in India to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

A lengthy report on the results of India Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union drawn from news sources and conversations with Indian officials. The response is described as highly positive with an expectation of closer political and economic cooperation between the two countries in the future.

August 24, 1955

Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Analysis of the Private Dinner and the 10th Meeting and Instructions for the 11th Meeting of the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks'

The Foreign Ministry instructed Wang that China would not have a determined time to release all the American citizens, as the US requested. However, China could agree to deal with the issue “as soon as possible” in the amendment.

August 3, 1955

Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to Wang Bingnan, 'Instructions for the Third Meeting of the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks'

The Chinese Foreign Ministry suspected that China’s release of 11 American spies had put pressure on the US side, making the US open to the idea of having a higher level meeting. The Foreign Ministry instructed the Chinese representatives to urge the US to promise to release Chinese students in the US in the next meeting, and also urge the US to accept the suggestion of bringing in third country (India) to help the release process, including financial support.

August 7, 1955

Instructions from the PRC Foreign Ministry On the Issue of Chinese Students in the US at the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks

The Chinese Foreign Ministry instructed Wang Bingnan how to counter-argue when Americans objected China’s suggestions regarding release of Chinese students in the US.

August 10, 1955

Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to Wang Bingnan, 'Talking Points for the Fifth Meeting'

The Chinese Foreign Ministry instructed Chinese Representative Wang Bingnan to have the following major agreements in writing on the fifth meeting:
(1) Any nationals who were willing to return to their countries should be granted permission;
(2) China designated India and the US designated the UK to facilitate the repatriation of each other’s nationals.

Pagination