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Documents

1965

Organizing Cargo to be Shipped by Air Transport from China to Burma, Cambodia, and Pakistan

A report on organizing air routes between China and Burma, Cambodia, and Pakistan.

July 16, 1964

Record of Conversation from Chairman Mao’s Reception of with Pakistani Minister of Commerce Wahid Zaman

Mao and Wahid Zaman discuss Pakistan and China's problems with India, imperialism, and the economic conditions in their countries.

May 19, 1982

Memorandum of Conversations between SED General Secretary Erich Honecker and Afghan Leader Babrak Karmal

Karmal describes threats against the Soviet-backed Afghan government from Pakistan, Iran, the US, China, and Egypt.

August 22, 1960

Memorandum of Conversation Between Deputy Minister Geng and Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan Abdur Rahman Khan at Ambassador Khan’s Banquet for Vice Premier Chen

Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan Khan and Chinese Deputy Minister Geng discuss Sino-Afghani trade, Sino-Pakistani relations, and the status of Pakistani and Chinese nationals in Indonesia. While both officials express hope that Sino-Pakistani relations will improve and any Sino-Pakistani border issues will soon be resolved, Geng expresses his displeasure with Pakistan's long-standing opposition to the restoration of China's seat at the UN.

July 25, 1959

Deputy Department Director He Ying Receives Indonesian Chargé d'Affaires Suleman and Discusses Matters Related to Sino-Pakistani Relations

He Ying and Suleman discuss the visit of a Chinese Muslim delegation from Taiwan to Pakistan and the state of Sino-Pakistani relations more generally.

July 1991

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 5-91C, 'Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control'

With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.

January 20, 1983

Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13/32-83, 'Chinese Policy and Practices Regarding Sensitive Nuclear Transfers'

With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began was beginning to worry US government officials. These concerns did not go away during the Reagan administration. While nuclear proliferation was not a top priority, the administration was apprehensive about the implications of the spread of nuclear capabilities and that China may have been aiding and abetting some potential proliferators by selling unsafeguarded nuclear materials.

December 7, 1979

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, Central Intelligence Agency, Enclosing Report, 'A Review of the Evidence of Chinese Involvement in Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program'

With nuclear proliferation a policy priority for the Jimmy Carter administration, and Pakistan already a special concern, the possibility that China and Pakistan were sharing nuclear weapons-related information began was beginning to worry US government officials. They had no hard evidence--and the soft evidence that concerned them is massively excised in the December 1979 report just as Beijing and Washington were normalizing relations—so the “precise nature and extent of this cooperation is uncertain.”

January 20, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

June 9, 1982

Conversation between Soviet Foreign Ministry Official Mikhail S. Kapitsa and Deputy Foreign Minister of Mongolia D. Yondon

Record of conversation between Mikhail S. Kapitsa, the head of the First Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and D. Yondon, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic. They discuss foreign relations with China, Japan and North Korea. They also discuss the current situation in Vietnam, India and Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Pagination