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Documents

June 9, 1965

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'The Soviet Revisionists Handling of and Response to China's Second Nuclear Explosion'

The Chinese Embassy in Moscow reports responses to the second Chinese nuclear test among Soviet news agencies, upper and middle class citizens, and students.

May 15, 1965

Cable from the Military Attache of the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Reactions to China's Second Nuclear Explosion'

The Chinese Embassy in Moscow reports reactions from students and military personnel in the USSR to China's second nuclear test.

October 22, 1964

Cable from Chen Jiakang, 'Riyadal's Views on China's Testing of an Atomic Bomb'

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the United Arab Republic [Egypt] describing a positive conversation between Chinese Ambassador Chen Jiakang and Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic Mahmoud Riad on China's testing of an Atomic Bomb.

October 20, 1964

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Vietnam, 'Reactions to China's Testing of an Atomic Bomb (6)'

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Vietnam entails positive responses of Le Duan, Pham Hùng and Ly Ban regarding China's first testing of an Atomic Bomb.

October 19, 1964

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Algeria, 'Reactions to China's Testing of a Nuclear Bomb'

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Algeria describes positive responses of foreign government officials stationed in Algeria on China's first nuclear weapons test.

May 19, 1965

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, 'Reactions to China's Nuclear Test'

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan describes different responses of Pakistani government officials and foreign government diplomats in Pakistan regarding China's first nuclear weapons test.

October 16, 1964

Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China

The Government of China announces its successful nuclear test but states that it will follow a no first use policy and in fact desires for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

May 30, 1967

Intelligence Note 418 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'Probable Effects of Chinese Possession of MRBMs on Vietnam War'

A prospective Chinese MRBM force led INR to consider whether Beijing would believe that it had more freedom of action to step up its involvement in the Vietnam War: it “might feel freer in extending aid to Hanoi and becoming more involved in the war if US pressure on the North Vietnamese seemed to require it.”

March 27, 1967

Intelligence Note 242 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'Peking May Have ICBMs in 1971'

Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a “few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles” as early as 1971.

January 11, 1967

Intelligence Note 13 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'The Chinese Nuclear Threat to Non-Communist Asia'

Prepared by Edward Hurwitz, a Foreign Service officer and future ambassador then on assignment to INR, this report treated ICBMs as China’s main weapons goal, an eventual means for a “credible threat” to Beijing’s U.S. and Soviet “arch enemies.”

Pagination