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Documents

April 4, 1958

Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Zhou Enlai on the Prohibition of Nuclear Testing

Khrushchev writes to Zhou outlining the Soviet Union's argument for the need to halt the testing of atomic weapons, and urges the Chinese to support and agree to the ban.

March 22, 1957

Memorandum from the Soviet Government to the Chinese Government on the Arms Reduction Issue

A memorandum from the Soviet government to the Chinese updating them on the arms reduction talks, a key component of which was a prohibition of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The Soviet proposal also called for reductions in conventional weapons and the prohibition of installing nuclear weapons outside their territorial borders.

January 31, 1955

Address by Zhou Enlai at the Plenary Session of the Fourth Meeting of the State Council (Excerpt)

Zhou Enlai addresses the State Council citing a need for China to "master atomic energy." The Chinese program is far behind in this area, but plans to catch up with the help of Soviet technical assistance.

February 17, 1984

Hugh Montgomery, director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, to Ambassador Ronald Spiers, Enclosing 'India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation,' Report 778-AR

A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.

1983

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan: Security Planning and the Nuclear Option,' Report 83-AR

A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.

November 8, 1982

'Pakistan-US: Demarche on F-16 Equipment,' 11/8/82, with Memo from McMahon to Carlucci, 'Risk Assessment of the Sale of AN/ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan,'1 1/8/82, and Excerpt from Natl Intel Est on Pakistan

With delivery of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers imminent, Pakistan threatens to refuse delivery unless the U.S. agrees to include the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. CIA analysts have concerns that including this sensitive radar technology in the delivery of the F-16s would enable China, a close military ally of Pakistan, to obtain and study the device.

June 17, 1982

Terry Jones, Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, Dept of State, to J. Devine et al., enclosing summaries of State Dept cable traffic during 1981-1982 relating to demarches on attempted purchase of sensitive nuclear-related products

A summary of U.S. State Department cable traffic regarding Pakistan’s nuclear efforts in 1981-1982. While the Reagan administration was inclined to give Pakistan some leeway in light of their support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology from abroad was still something that the administration was against. Evidence that Pakistan had made efforts, some successful, to acquire specific technology that suggested a nuclear test was being prepared raised a red flag in the U.S. government

April 9, 1981

Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

October 27, 1978

Conspect of Conversations with V. I. Potapov, Chief of Romanian Sector of CPSU CC Section

V.I Potapov informs about a visit to Bucharest of the CPSU delegation led by A. A. Gromyko and the discussions regarding the “Bessarabian question,” criticism of the CPSU regarding RSR’s relations with the USA and NATO and independent relations with China, RSR’s distancing from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in terms of foreign policy.

June 27, 1978

Exposition of the Conversations with Cde. V. I. Potapov, Chief of the Romanian Sector of the CPSU CC

Briefing given by V. I. Potapov on the dispute between the USSR and the SSR regarding the historical treatment of Soviet-Romanian relations. The SSR was accused of pursuing an independent foreign policy and offering a bad example for other socialist countries. Some issues examined were: the Romanian position in the Belgrade Negotiations, the RCP attitude towards “Eurocommunism," the Romanian position towards Africa, the Middle East and China and the Moldavian question.

Pagination