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Documents

April 5, 1965

Cable from Zhu Qiwen, 'The Vietnamese Side passing on the Soviet Communist Party’s Proposal regarding the Holding of a Three-Party Summit among the Soviet Party, and the Vietnamese Party, and the Chinese Party'

Zhu Qiwen reports on possible Soviet motives in proposing a three-party meeting between North Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union.

August 17, 1964

Record of Conversation from Chairman Mao’s Reception of the Algerian Ambassador to China Mohamed Yala

List of Mao and Yala's main points of discussion, including successful party building, battling imperialism, and suppressing counter-revolutions, as well as record of their conversation regarding the state of Algeria's foreign relations with Vietnam, the US, and others.

March 31, 1964

Record of Conversation from Chairman Mao’s Reception of the Military Delegation from the Kingdom of Cambodia

Mao and Lon Nol discuss Chinese-Cambodian ties, Cambodia's relations with Vietnam and Thailand, and US policy in Southeast Asia.

November 9, 1964

Record of Conversation between Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomułka and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Moscow

Zhou Enlai and Gomulka discuss the Sino-Soviet split following Khrushchev's removal as well as Poland's involvement in maintaining peace in Vietnam.

November 10, 1966

Note of Comrade Bergold, East German Ambassador, with the Polish Ambassador in North Vietnam, Comrade Siedliecky

A note on a conversation between Mao Zedong and Le Duan. Zedong confronts Le Duan with instances where he has spoken out against China. Le Duan states that Vietnam does not support the Cultural Revolution, but will do nothing to oppose it. He answers other questions about economic policy and Soviet revisionism.

September 1966

Information on the Visit of a Czechoslovak Party and Government Delegation Headed by [Czechoslovak Prime Minister] Comrade Lenart in North Vietnam, 24-28 September 1966

Information on a Czechoslovak delegation to the DRV. The Czechoslovak delegation assess the Vietnamese situation and determine that the Vietnamese successes are overestimated while American strength and fighting potential are underestimated. The Czechoslovak and Vietnamese groups disagree on China, with the Czechoslovak delegation saying the Vietnamese are simply unable to take a stance against China because it would jeopardize the aid they are receiving.

September 1966

Information from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee to the Polish United Workers’ Party Central Committee

A record of a North Vietnamese delegation to Moscow, which affirmed their belief that they would be able to defeat the Americans. They raise a request for additional supplies in 1967, and it is noted that China has continued to refuse to unite with the other socialist countries, which has complicated matters.

July 9, 1966

Note on a Conversation with the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Comrade Sverev, on 8 July 1966 from 11:00 a.m. to 12:40 p.m. at the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi

Conversation with First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Sverev, describing the Vietnamese attitude toward China as becoming colder. At the same time, printing of China's anti-Soviet propaganda has become more limited and the Vietnamese appear grateful for Soviet aid. Sverev also estimates that there are over 200,000 Chinese troops stationed in North Vietnam.

November 10, 1966

Note on a Talk with the Soviet Ambassador, Comrade [Ilya] Shcherbakov, on 28 October 1966 in the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi

Soviet Ambassador Ilya Shcherbakov reported that Vietnamese officers lately seem defensive and not trusting, while emphasizing their autonomy. Also states that Ho Chi Minh was made to promise not to talk with the US or call for volunteers from socialist countries without first consulting the Chinese.

July 8, 1966

Telegram from East German Deputy Foreign Minister Hegen to Ulbricht, Stoph, Honecker, and Axen

Telegram from the GDR ambassador to China, Bierbach, assesses the Chinese position in the Vietnam conflict. He states that China aims to exacerbate the conflict for it's own gain; by pushing theDRV to action in the South, it focuses its efforts in the North, with minimal risk of conflict with US troops. Specifically, Bierbach believes China is attempting to instigate a conflict between the US and the USSR.

Pagination