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Documents

November 26, 1973

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 052312

The document describes a consensus at the UN regarding the Korean issue after an understanding was reached between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. Thea author observes that some of the US media believes that the US came to a compromise solution with China because Nixon wanted to avoid having more political issues.

July 31, 1973

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 091.722, Normal

Romanians note that the Chinese are worried about the possible vacuum left behind on the Korean Peninsula if the US withdraws from South Korea. The telegram notes that the Chinese will not oppose continued US presence in South Korea even after the dissolution of the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

June 25, 1973

Telegram from Beijing, No.059.658, Urgent, SECRET

Romanian official comments on statements made by Premier Zhou Enlai that appeared on China's Renmin Ribao. The official notes that Zhou does not condition Sino-American relations on US withdrawal from South Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam. In fact, the official comments how Taiwan is overlooked and withdrawal of US troops from Korea is characterized as a request from Kim Il Sung.

May 14, 1973

Telegram from Beijing, No.059.484, Urgent, SECRET

Pyongyang forwards ideas for exchange of commerce, people and goods between North and South Korea. These include bringing surplus labor in the South to work in North Korea, jointly creating irrigation system using North Korean expertise, etc. However, South Korea remains distrustful of the motives of North Korea.

March 21, 1973

Telegram from Bucharest to Pyongyang, SECRET, No. 02/01810

Romanian officials describe disagreements between the South and North Korean delegations during the second session of the South-North Coordination Committee (SNCC).

December 4, 1950

Memorandum of Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR and Gromyko

Their discussion involves the idea of a definite Soviet victory in Korea, the failure of US soldiers and President Truman, the internal politics of the US; internal politics of China, the progress of the decision about Germany among the Soviets as well as other Western powers.

March 6, 1954

Cable from Zhang Wentian, 'Reporting the Preliminary Opinions of Our Side on the Geneva Conference to the Soviet Side'

Zhang Wentian discusses his visit with Molotov. During this meeting, Molotov says delegations from China, Korea, and Vietnam are welcome to Moscow before the Geneva conference to discuss its proceedings. Molotov also mentions several issues that still need to be discussed, such as relaxing tensions in Asia, Korean unification, ministers in attendance at the conference, and India's participation in the Indochina discussion.

May 21, 1961

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, 'Contents of the May 18th North Korean Party Central Standing Committee Meeting'

A Chinese report on a Meeting of the Central Standing Committee in which the North Koreans negatively reflected on the Park Chung Hee coup in South Korea.

June 20, 1963

Information About the Policy of the Korean Workers Party from the East German Embassy

Criticisms of the DPRK are made about Kim Il Sung's personality cult, concealment of socialist countries' support, waning cooperation with socialist countries, intensification of China-North Korea cooperation, and distancing from the Soviet Union.

April 26, 1954

Cable from Zhou Enlai, 'Regarding Speeches at the Conference and the Situation at the First Plenary Session'

Zhou Enlai reports on some last minute agreements regarding the conference procedures. It is decided that the Korean delegation will speak first, and that Thailand, Britain, and the Soviet Union will take turns chairing the conference.

Pagination