Report by SISMI (Military Intelligence) on the state of missile proliferation: programs and production capabilities of developing countries, analysis of countries that started autonomous missile programs. The paper also addresses the issue of possible indiscriminate diffusion of Chinese missile technology and components on the international market. Annex: Summary table.

Analysis of the recent Chinese nuclear weapon test and it's strategic implications for China's diplomatic and military policies.

An excerpt of a document recovered from the Air India 101 crash assessing China's military capabilities.

A prospective Chinese MRBM force led INR to consider whether Beijing would believe that it had more freedom of action to step up its involvement in the Vietnam War: it “might feel freer in extending aid to Hanoi and becoming more involved in the war if US pressure on the North Vietnamese seemed to require it.”

Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a “few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles” as early as 1971.

Prepared by Edward Hurwitz, a Foreign Service officer and future ambassador then on assignment to INR, this report treated ICBMs as China’s main weapons goal, an eventual means for a “credible threat” to Beijing’s U.S. and Soviet “arch enemies.”

Soviet Ambassador Yudin visited the Indian exhibition in Peking with Chairman Mao and Liu Shaoqi. Chairman Mao congratulated the Soviet Union on its latest achievements in missile and satellite developments and stated that the balance of power now shifted towards communist states.