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June 17, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fifteenth Plenary Session

Zhou reports on the fifteenth plenary session on Korea. After several of their proposals of the Soviet, Korean, and Chinese delegations are turned down, the other 16 nations issue a joint declaration to end the conference. After this, Zhou proposes that the 19 nations issue a joint statement reflecting their common desire to achieve the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue. This proposal is also rejected, and the meeting ends with no agreements made.

June 18, 1954

Minutes, Meeting between Zhou Enlai and the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey (Summary)

Zhou and Casey discuss issues of Korean unification, PRCs recognition in the UN, and Indochina. Zhou insists that if a nation establishes military bases in another country's territory, it is for aggressive reasons.

July 29, 1954

Memorandum of Conversation, between Soviet Premier Georgy M. Malenkov and Zhou Enlai

Soviet Premier Georgy M. Malenkov and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai discuss the incidents between China and Taiwan, the US’s support of Taiwan, and the US bloc in the South Pacific. They contemplate various means through which China could prevent further provocations by Taiwan and how to break apart the American bloc. Zhou Enlai also offers suggestions concerning the elections in Korea that would help accomplish Soviet goals for the area.

May 22, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Fourth Restricted Session

Zhou Enlai reports on the Indochina session and the upcoming Korea session. All sides agree on the order of discussion of a ceasefire in Indochina and that they are open to including more in the discussion.

June 2, 1954

Zhou Enlai’s Report to the Central Committee about His Contacts with Robert Eden and Georges Bidault

Zhou reports on issues raised at Eden's banquet. Zhou tells Eden that the commission of neutral nations overseeing the Korean elections should be made up of both European and Asian countries.

June 3, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Tenth Restricted Session

Zhou reports on the tenth restricted session on Indochina. Bidault spoke of the five functions of the NNSC for Indochina. Bidault opposes Poland's and Czechoslovakia's participation in the NNSC because he believes communist nations cannot be neutral.

June 4, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Eleventh Restricted Session

Zhou reports on the eleventh restricted session on Indochina. During the session, Zhou opposes using the UN as a supervisory body, and asserts that the joint commission should take major responsibility in implementing the armistice, and that the NNSC's function is to supervise the joint commission's work and the Indochina borders.

June 6, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and Others, Regarding the Situation at the Thirteenth Plenary Session

Zhou reports on the plenary session on the Korea issue. Mainly, Zhou writes of how the US is impeding negotiations because of their adamant stance in favor of UN supervisory body for Korean unification.

February 26, 1954

Cable from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee to CCP Central Committee, via Comrade Yudin

Comrade Pavel Yudin asks the CCP to inform Comrade Ho Chi Minh that the discussion at the upcoming conference in Geneva will include the Korea question and restoring peace in Indochina.

March 2, 1954

'Preliminary Opinions on the Assessment of and Preparation for the Geneva Conference,' Prepared by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (drafted by PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai) [Excerpt]

Zhou discusses the need to make agreements at the Geneva conference in order to open a path for discussion and negotiation with the west. Zhou notes that because the US, France and Britain are not united in their opinions, the CCP must hold fast to their positions on the peaceful unification of Korea, and of peace in Indochina. Finally, Zhou suggests that the CCP prepare to discuss issues of trade, relaxing international tensions, and breaking the US embargo, although these issues are not on the agenda.

Pagination