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Documents

May 19, 1975

Telegram from Moscow to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 050.572

The document summarizes North Korea's prospective approach towards unification. Pyongyang envisages three different paths: peaceful, military and revolutionary. In order to support these three routes to unification, the DPRK forwards three policies: the rapid development of socialism, promotion of democracy in South Korea and reinforcement of military solidarity with the revolutionary forces of the world.

May 9, 1975

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, No. 052.467

While the UN looks for ways to dismantle the UN headquarters in South Korea while preserving the armistice, the telegram notes that the North Koreans are attempting to bypass the UN as a whole and come to an understanding with the United States directly.

March 11, 1975

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 059.076

Popa observes an increase of US military presence in South Korea, including the transfer of nuclear weapons and notes that many see this move as Washington's way of coping with the Sino-Soviet split and increased division between Japan and the US.

December 2, 1974

Minutes of Conversation between Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu and Kim Dong-gyu

Kim and Ceausescu discuss the international political atmosphere. Kim shows his concern for the intensification of dissident movements in South Korea. The conversation highlights the fragility of military dictatorships as evidenced by the cases of Portugal and Greece.

August 19, 1974

The Official Visit Paid by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The document describes a cordial bilateral relationship between the DPRK and Romania. Pyongyang expresses its desire to continue consulting with Bucharest regarding the issue of dismantling UN bodies in South Korea. In addition, North Korea notes the imperative of establishing direct contact with the United States and plans on using Washington's positive or negative response to its advantage.

May 8, 1974

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 78.028

The Romanian representative in Washington note the delivery of the North Korean message to the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. The telegram notes that the US State Department does not wish this kind of communication between Pyongyang and Washington to be permanent.

April 22, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.180

Heo Dam seeks to replace the armistice with a peace treaty and establish direct contact with the United States to remove American troops from the peninsula.

March 24, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.127

In the aftermath of the failed inter-Korean dialogues, the North Koreans conclude that they must establish diplomatic relations with the United States. The telegram describes the rationale behind the move and the goal of limiting the interference of the United States on the Korean Peninsula. According to the author, North Korea believes that the rejection of the US to establish relations with the DPRK will expose Washington's opposition to the unification of Korea.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 052312

The document describes a consensus at the UN regarding the Korean issue after an understanding was reached between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. Thea author observes that some of the US media believes that the US came to a compromise solution with China because Nixon wanted to avoid having more political issues.

October 27, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061482, Urgent

Popa notes Kim Yeong-nam's concern regarding interference of the USSR and USA in the Yom Kippur/October War as a source of a wider conflict, contrary to the optimism expressed by the North Korean leadership.

Pagination