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Documents

August 26, 1976

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.219

The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang conveys the remarks of Han Sihae, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident of August 1976.

August 25, 1976

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, SECRET, Flash, No. 084.527

The Embassy of Romania in Washington, D.C., assesses the United States response to the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident of August 1976.

August 25, 1976

Telegram from Beijing to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 066.252

The Embassy of Romania in Beijing assess the Chinese response to the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident of August 1976.

August 21, 1976

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.212

The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang reports on the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident of August 1976.

August 20, 1976

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.387

The Romanian Mission to the United Nations in New York reports on developments related to the Panmunjeom or "Axe Murder" Incident at the UN.

August 6, 1976

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.190

The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang summarizes and analyzes the “declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea government,” a report prepared by Jeon Myeong-su, DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister.

April 14, 1976

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, SECRET, Regular, No. 083.895

The Embassy of Romania in Washington, D.C., conveys the remarks of Robert Martens, Head of Regional Affairs within the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs from the Department of State, on developments in Korea.

May 19, 1975

Telegram from Moscow to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 050.572

The document summarizes North Korea's prospective approach towards unification. Pyongyang envisages three different paths: peaceful, military and revolutionary. In order to support these three routes to unification, the DPRK forwards three policies: the rapid development of socialism, promotion of democracy in South Korea and reinforcement of military solidarity with the revolutionary forces of the world.

March 11, 1975

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 059.076

Popa observes an increase of US military presence in South Korea, including the transfer of nuclear weapons and notes that many see this move as Washington's way of coping with the Sino-Soviet split and increased division between Japan and the US.

March 24, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.127

In the aftermath of the failed inter-Korean dialogues, the North Koreans conclude that they must establish diplomatic relations with the United States. The telegram describes the rationale behind the move and the goal of limiting the interference of the United States on the Korean Peninsula. According to the author, North Korea believes that the rejection of the US to establish relations with the DPRK will expose Washington's opposition to the unification of Korea.

Pagination