This decree tasks the Soviet MFA with obtaining an agreement from fellow members of the Warsaw Pact on the USSR's suggested revisions to the NPT.

Andrei Gromyko describes the diplomatic measures he deems necessary to ensure the adherence of influential nations and countries in the Socialist sphere to the NPT. Valuing negotiation and diplomatic conversations between representatives, Gromyko especially seeks to obtain the support of countries who have previously expressed reservations about the treaty.

Talking points for Soviet ambassadors to Socialist states to use in conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs. The ambassadors are told to relay the message that adherence to the NPT is beneficial for all Socialist nations and their allies.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 5 December 1989 describes the latest developments in Philippines, East Germany, the Soviet Union, South Korea, Cambodia, Chile, Warsaw Pact, European Community, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe.

An analysis of the complete removal of Soviet troops and its potential effects on Hungarian elections.

This statute creates an inter-governmental commission aimed at coordinating the efforts of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People’s Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People’s Republic, the USSR, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to prevent exports that might be used by capitalist or developing countries to reach their military or economic potentials.

Treaty establishing the Warsaw Pact in response to the integration of West Germany into NATO.

A Romanian official at the Embassy in Budapest reports on the Hungarian response to Ceaușescu's 19 August 1989 appeal regarding the situation in Poland.

János Kádár presents on his diplomatic trip to Moscow to the Hungarian Central Committee. Kádár first places the Cuban Missile Crisis in context. This includes describing the success of the Cuban revolution, US aggression towards Cuba, and the Cuban-Soviet military and defense agreement, which ultimately spawned the US’s unilateral military mobilization. Kádár then describes the Soviet Union’s strategy to achieve two goals: protect the Cuban revolution and preserve peace. He notes that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree about how the crisis was resolved, but asks the congress of workers to show complete support of Soviet actions and successes.

The document includes Hungarian Council of Ministers meeting minutes from 25 October 1962. The minutes are dominated by János Kádár’s detailed overview of events leading up to the current international situation. The overview is preceded by the Council of Ministers approving the government’s public statement on the Cuban Missille Crisis. During the session Kádár summarizes US provocation, Cuban and Soviet responses, and the military mobilization of different countries and military alliances, and Hungary’s political campaign in support of Cuba. Kádár notes negotiations between Cuba, the US, and Soviet Union initiate the day before. The minutes also include exchanges between Kádár and other Council of Ministers representatives.