The State Department approves with “comments and recommendations” a November 15, 1956, CIA/International Operations Division draft of revised guidelines for the Free Europe Committee (FEC) with handwritten revisions [presumably by a State official].

Cord Meyer forwards to Allen Dulles a State Department assessment dated November 13, 1956, of Radio Free Europe Hungarian and Polish broadcasts. The assessment was requested by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and was prepared by State Department official L. Randolph Higgs, responsible for coordinating RFE issues with CIA, and Meyer, who objected to an initial State Department draft.

CIA/International Operations Division routing slips raise questions about an attached Free Europe Committee (FEC) draft dated November 12 on the FEC’s role in the wake of the Hungarian Revolution and note that the FEC [in New York] did not forward to Radio Free Europe Munich certain CIA guidances on broadcast policy.

An authoritative, cautionary US government guidance, approved by Allen Dulles and Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy, conveyed to the Free Europe Committee that afternoon.

An annex to the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) “169 Study” on U.S. international communications reviews the goals and effectiveness of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

The Soviet leadership discusses the state of Soviet foreign policy after the Hungarian crisis and Khrushchev’s visit to the US. Molotov criticizes Khrushchev for recklessness in foreign policy direction. Soviet inroads in the Middle East and the Third World are analyzed. The effects of the crises in Eastern Europe are placed in the context of the struggle against US imperialism.

Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.

Meeting minutes taken by Romanian Ambassador Vasile Sandru at sessions of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee, taking place in Moscow on 22-23 November 1978. Session I contains a speech by Leonid Brezhnev in which he discusses détente, Warsaw Pact economic cooperation, disarmament, national liberation movements, and relations with China, the Western countries, and Japan. In Session II and III political leaders of the other Warsaw member countries respond to Brezhnev’s speech. Session IV features a report by Commander-in-Chief Viktor Kulikov on the United Armed Forces. He recommends an increase in military expenditures. All of the leaders agree, except for Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania.

This document explains the views of the cooperating Socialist countries relating to Afghanistan. The USSR perceived the US attempt to line up NATO support against the Soviets as an aggressive action, designed to counter Soviet influence. The Soviets, by contrast, viewed their involvement in Afghanistan as increasing their sphere of influence around the Warsaw-pact countries, making such actions defense, rather than offensive. The USSR's leadership states that it should increase its ties to NATO countries to counteract the foreign policy of the US.

Report on the main aspects of international trade for the year 1966. The report covers issues such as developing countries’ growth in exports, the trade balances of various Western countries, East-West trade, and trends for 1967.