CIA Memorandum for President Truman on US position on Soviet actions in Berlin.

Summarizes Soviet objectives and strategies in entering into Four-Power discussions about Berlin and Germany.

1973 agreement between the Stasi and the KGB outlining their cooperative efforts to fight "ideological subversion" and uncover "the hostile plans of the enemy." Both secret services would also exchange information gathered by their espionage activities and provide mutual support in infiltrating agents. Of particular mutual interest was espionage against the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. To this end, the KGB was permitted to recruit East German citizens, and the MfS would secure their ongoing contacts.

Selected excerpts from Khrushchev's concluding speech at a conference of Warsaw Pact leader, focused on the building crisis over the status of Berlin.

This is a memorandum of a conversation between the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in East Berlin, Rodin, and the director of the West Berlin Press Office, Günter Struve, with regard to China's intention to establish a trade representation in West Berlin. Apart from stressing that by initiating diplomatic relations with West Berlin, China is not implicitly acknowledging the existing international agreements, Rodin makes clear that East Germany will not rescind the rules on obligatory currency exchange for citizens of Western states.

Report on the course and results of the 20th Session of the Committee of Ministers of Defense of Warsaw Pact Member States held in Bucharest on November 24-25, 1987.

The second conversation between Stalin and the SED leadership during their trip to Moscow in April 1952. Stalin discusses the political and military situation in East Germany and asks about the status of economic development in the GDR. The SED delegation asks Stalin to approve the transfer of raw materials to East Germany.

The authors accuse "fascist and other organizations, working primarily under the leadership of American intelligence," to be responsible for the uprisings in Berlin and other GDR cities. The authors stated that "Adenauer intended to exploit this disenchantment to strengthen his position before the upcoming Bundestag elections in August-September of this year." The CC SED is accused having not paid attention to short-lived strikes in early June. According to the authors "the events in Berlin on 16-19 June were completely unexpected to the leadership of GDR". Finally the authors drew a few conclusions and gave some recommendations "in order to correct the situation in the GDR."

This compact German-Russian dictionary came to light in 1967. The dictionary is anonymous: it has no indication of title, authorship, publisher, place and date of publication - there are no indications at all. On reading through it, it is clear that it contains Cheka terminology, and was compiled after 1954. When translated into Russian, these terms were to assist operational officers working in the USSR KGB Establishment attached to the GDR MfS [Ministerium für Staatssicherheit] - helping them to read secret German-language materials supplied in great quantities by the GDR MfS [2], sent on to the Centre with a cover note, and to carry on conversations on Chekist themes with their German colleagues.

In this folder Mitrokhin describes the work experience of German KGB agent Conrad (codename “Gregor”), his experience as a spy, involvement with communist parties in different countries, and activities as the head of military sabotage groups in Western Europe.